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New Tech v. New Deal: Fintech as a Systemic
Phenomenon
Saule T. Omarovat
Fintech is the hottest topic in finance today. Recent advances in
cryptography, data analytics, and machine learning are visibly "disrupting"
traditional methods of delivering financial services and conducting financial
transactions. Less visibly, fintech is also changing the way we think about
finance: it is gradually recasting our collective understandingof the financial
system in normatively neutral terms of applied information science. By making
financial transactionseasier, faster, and cheaper, fintech seems to promise a
micro-level "win-win" solution to thefinancialsystem's many ills.
This Article challengessuch narrativesandpresents an alternativeaccount
offintech as a systemic, macro-level phenomenon. Grounding the analysis of
evolvingfintech trends in a broaderinstitutionalcontext, the Article exposes the
normative and political significance offintech as the catalystfor a potentially
decisive shift in the underlyingpublic-privatebalance ofpowers, competencies,
and roles in the financialsystem. In developing this argument, the Article makes
three principal scholarly contributions. First, it introduces the concept of the
New Deal settlement in finance: a fundamental politicalarrangement, in force
for nearly a century, pursuant to which profit-seeking private actors retain
control over allocating capital and generating financial risks, while the
sovereign public bears responsibility for maintaining systemic financial
stability. Second, the Article advances a novel conceptual framework for
understanding the deep-seated dynamics that have eroded the New Deal
settlement in recent decades. It offers a taxonomy of core mechanisms that both
(a) enable private actorsto continuously synthesize tradablefinancialassets and
scale up tradingactivities, and (b) undermine the public's ability to manage the
resulting system-wide risks. Finally, the Article shows how and why specific
fintech applications-cryptocurrencies,distributedledger technologies, digital
crowdfunding, and robo-advising are poised to amplify the effect of these
destabilizing mechanisms, and thus potentially exacerbate the tensions and
imbalances in today's financial markets and the broader economy. It is this
potential that rendersfintech a public policy challenge ofthe highest order.

Beth and Marc Goldberg Professor of Law, Cornell University. For thoughtful comments
and criticisms, I thank participants at conferences and workshops at Vanderbilt Law School, Oxford
University, the University of Texas Law School, the Baldy Center for Law and Social Policy at SUNYBuffalo, and the University of Pennsylvania Law School. Special thanks to my colleague and frequent
collaborator, Bob Hockett. All errors are mine.
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Introduction
"Fintech," a popular term referring to the wide universe of innovative
technology-enabled financial services, is by far the hottest topic in today's
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finance. Fintech is visibly changing the way we conduct financial transactions
and use financial services: volatile cryptocurrencies are becoming a mainstream
trading asset, companies are raising capital by issuing digital tokens instead of
securities, and robots are advising people on some of the most important
financial decisions of their lives.2 Less visibly, however, fintech is also
beginning to change the way we think about finance. Increasingly ubiquitous, the
fintech phenomenon is gradually refraining our understanding of the financial
system in seemingly objective, science-driven terms, as yet another sphere of
targeted application of information technologies and computer analytics.
This emerging narrative of finance is seductive in its simplifying elegance.
It focuses on concrete transactionalaspects of finance, rather than its inherently
complex systemic dynamics. Targeting solutions for identified and isolated
frictions in financial market transactions, fintech embodies an inherently microrather than macro-level view of the financial system. It deals with clearly
functionally defined, programmable (and thus controllable) business processes
and tools, rather than difficult normative judgments and policy tradeoffs. Yet,
the fintech narrative also has distinct undertones of a social revolution in its
broader aspirations to rebuild financial markets on principles of mutuality,
cooperation, and inclusiveness. In that sense, its implicit promise is to redefine
not only how we transact with one another, but also who we are as a community:
new technology will succeed where old politics failed.3
What should we make of this emerging narrative? Does fintech signify a
genuine revolutionary shift in the fundamental dynamics of finance? And, if so,
what are the nature and potential implications of this fintech revolution? Is it
capable of delivering the ultimate-normatively neutral and politically
uncontestable-cure for the financial system's underlying dysfunctions?

1.
See, e.g., Garrett Baldwin, The Top 10 Trends in Fintech, FUTURES (Apr. 15, 2016),
http://www.futuresmag.com/2016/04/15/top-10-trends-fintech [https://perma.cc/FV97-LCVR] ("No term
is more ubiquitous in today's financial media than fintech."); Daniel Newman, Top 5 Digital
Transformation
Trends
in
Financial
Services,
FORBES
(May
9,
2017),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielnewman/2017/05/09/top-5-digital-transformation-trends-infinancial-services/#75cd2c1e204c [https://perma.cc/HD3Z-JZ4A] ("If it feels like this change is fast and
furious, you're right."); Bob Pisani, Here's Where Fintech Is Heading Next, CNBC (June 6, 2016),
https://www.cnbc.com/2016/06/06/heres-where-fintech-is-heading-next.html
[https://perma.cc/VEU76BUQ] ("The interaction between finance and technology, or 'fintech,' remains a hot topic.").
2.
For example, in 2017, an influential industry report identified seventeen distinct
"fintech services" offered by a wide array of providers in such areas as "money transfer and payments,
financial planning, savings and investment, borrowing, and insurance." ERNST & YOUNG, EY FINTECH
ADOPTION
INDEX
2017:
THE
RAPID
EMERGENCE
OF
FINTECH
6,
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-fintech-adoption-index-2017/$FILE/ey-fintechadoption-index-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/RQ39-L5VV].
3.
See, e.g., Avi Salzman, Blockchain Is Starting to Show Real Promise Amid the Hype,
BARRON'S (Aug. 17, 2018), https://www.barrons.com/articles/blockchain-is-starting-to-show-realpromise-amid-the-hype-1534554901 [https://perma.cc/PB3L-BB7J] (quoting an industry insider's
definition of blockchain as "a technological solution to a political problem").
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The purpose of this Article is not to provide definitive answers to these
questions. Rather, it is to propose a general conceptual framework within which
they should be addressed. Much has already been, and continues to be, written
about the rise of fintech and its growing impact on financial markets and
regulation. Legal scholars, in particular, are increasingly interested in various
legal and regulatory challenges posed by the new technological advances in
finance. Some of the most valuable insights to date have come from the
literature examining specific legal, economic, or operational aspects of
individual fintech applications.6 Alongside these targeted legal analyses, there is
a rapidly expanding body of scholarship that attempts to take a broader inventory
of issues fintech raises for lawmakers and financial regulators.' This literature

4.
For a small sample ofrecent high-profile reports and studies, see FIN. STABILITY BD.,
FINANCIAL STABILITY IMPLICATIONS FROM FINTECH (June 27, 2017), http://www.fsb.org/wpcontent/uploads/R270617.pdf [https://perma.cc/QG98-EUH3]; FIN. STABILITY BD., FINTECH CREDIT:
MARKET STRUCTURE, BUSINESS MODELS AND FINANCIAL STABILITY IMPLICATIONS (May 22, 2017),

http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/CGFS-FSB-Report-on-FinTech-Credit.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5DUJ-YWSG]; U.K. CRYPTOASSETS TASKFORCE, FINAL REPORT (Oct. 2018),
https:/assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachmentdata/file/75207
0/cryptoassets_taskforcefinal report final web.pdf [https://perma.cc/E485-3P5Y]; U.S. DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY, REPORT TO PRESIDENT TRUMP:
OPPORTUNITIES:
NONBANK
FINANCIALS,

A

FINANCIAL
FINTECH,

SYSTEM THAT CREATES
AND

INNOVATION

ECONOMIC

(July

2018),

https://home.treasury.gov/sites/default/files/2018-07/A-Financial-System-that-Creates-EconomicOpportunities---Nonbank-Financi....pdf[https://perma.cc/C6PQ-NG4J] [hereinafter TREASURY REPORT];
WORLD ECON. FORUM, REALIZING THE POTENTIAL OF BLOCKCHAIN: A MULTISTAKEHOLDERAPPROACH
TO
THE
STEWARDSHIP
OF
BLOCKCHAIN
AND
CRYPTOCURRENCIES
(June
2017),

http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF RealizingPotential Blockchain.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PGW4J4Y6]; John Schindler, FinTech andFinancialInnovation: Driversand Depth (Fed. Reserve Fin. & Econ.
Discussion
Series
Paper
No.
2017-081,
2017),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/201708 lpap.pdf[https://perma.cc/CS2B-F43J].
5.
For a sample of the rapidly growing legal scholarship on these issues, see Douglas
W. Arner, Janos Barberis & Ross P. Buckley, FinTech, RegTech, and Reconceptualization ofFinancial
Regulation, 37 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 371 (2017); Douglas W. Arner, Janos Barberis & Ross P. Buckley,
The Evolution ofFintech:A New Post-CrisisParadigm?,47 GEO. J. INT'L L. 1271 (2016); Chris Brummer
& Yesha Yadav, Fintech and the Innovation Trilemma, 107 GEO. L.J. 235 (2019); Iris H-Y Chiu, Fintech
and Disruptive Business Models in FinancialProducts, Intermediation, and Market-PolicyImplications

for FinancialRegulators, 21 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 55 (2016); Rory Van Loo, Making Innovation More
Competitive: The Case of Fintech, 65 UCLA L. REV. 232 (2018); William J. Magnuson, Regulating
Fintech, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1167 (2018); and Dirk A. Zetzsche et al., From FinTech to TechFin: The
Regulatory Challenges of Data-Driven Finance (EBI Working Paper Series No. 6, 2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2959925 [https://perma.cc/A69R-923L].
6.
See, e.g., John Armour & Luca Enriques, The Promise and Perilsof Crowdfunding:
Between Corporate Finance and Consumer Contracts, 81 MOD. L. REV. 51 (2018); Shlomit AzgadTromer, Crypto Securities: On the Risks ofInvestments in Blockchain-BasedAssets and the Dilemmas of

SecuritiesRegulation, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 69 (2018); Tom Baker & Benedict G. C. Dellaert, Regulating
Robo Advice Across the FinancialServices Industry, 103 IOWA L. REV. 713 (2018); Adam J. Levitin,
Pandora'sDigitalBox: The Promise and Perils ofDigital Wallets, 166 U. PA. L. REV. (2017); Jeanne
Schroeder, Bitcoin and the Uniform Commercial Code, 24 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1 (2016); Angela
Walch, The Bitcoin Blockchain as FinancialMarketInfrastructure:A Considerationof OperationalRisk,

18 J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 837 (2015); Shaanan Cohney et al., Coin-OperatedCapitalism, 119 COLUM.
L. REV. 591 (2019).
7.
See sources cited supra note 5. For analyses focusing on financial regulators'
attempts to encourage technological innovation and to develop their own technological capabilities, see
Rory Van Loo, Rise ofthe DigitalRegulator, 66 DUKE L.J. 1267 (2017); Hilary J. Allen, A US Regulatory
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helpfully identifies certain key considerations the regulators should "keep in
mind" as they address such issues in practice and discusses innovative ways for
regulators to "stay on top" of technological change. Yet, it stops short of offering
a coherent conceptual account of fintech as a systemic phenomenon. As the list
of identified regulatory concerns and considerations grows longer and more
detailed, however, the need for an overarching conceptual framework within
which to analyze the role of technology in finance becomes increasingly
pressing.'
Aiming to fill this gap in the existing literature, this Article takes a deeper
and more encompassing systemic view of fintech, both as a financial market
phenomenon and as a regulatory challenge. It takes a position that, in order to
make real sense of technological changes "disrupting" today's financial markets
and regulations, it is necessary to broaden the analytical and normative lens
beyond the immediate economic and legal effects of specific fintech
applications. At bottom, an inquiry into the nature and dynamics of the "fintech
revolution" is, and should be, an integral part of the broader inquiry into the
nature and dynamics of finance itself The latter, in tum, is, and should be, a
fundamentally normative inquiry into the social function and, by extension,
dysfunction-of modem finance. Therefore, the Article posits, the role of
technology in finance cannot be properly assessed, or even understood, without
explicitly addressing the underlying questions about the role of today's finance
in the broader socio-economic system.
The emerging fintech narrative in its present form, however, tends to mask
this underlying continuity. The newly empowered and fashionable notion of
"finance as technology" is threatening to eclipse that of "finance as public
policy." This Article seeks to reintegrate these two concepts, both as a matter of
descriptive accuracy and as a normative matter. Technology enables and drives
financial transactions, but so does public policy embodied in financial laws and
regulations. On a micro-level, finance often appears primarily, if not purely,
transactional: a matter of individualized private exchange among market actors.
On a macro-level, however, modem finance is a matter not only of great public
importance but also of great public involvement.9 The rise of fintech throws into

Sandbox? (Working Paper, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3056993
[https://perma.cc/5VUE-QXNQ]. A somewhat distinct thread in this literature focuses more narrowly on
fintech-related changes in the familiar patterns of transactional "intermediation" in various contexts. See
Benjamin Geva, DisintermediatingElectronicPayments:DigitalCash and Virtual Currencies,31 J. INT'L
BANKING L. & REG. 661 (2017); Kathryn Judge, The Future ofDirectFinance: The DivergingPaths of
Peer-to-PeerLending and Kickstarter,50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 603 (2015).
8.
For a recent review of the emerging economic research on fintech, see Peter Gomber,
Jascha-Alexander Koch & Michael Siering, DigitalFinance and Fintech: CurrentResearch and Future
Research Directions, 87 J. Bus. ECON. 537 (2017). As this review shows, there are presently significant
gaps in the economic literature on the subject.
9.
For an in-depth theoretical account of the fundamental hybridity of modern finance
as a public-private enterprise, see Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, The FinanceFranchise, 102
CORNELL L. REV. 1143 (2017).
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sharp relief this essential hybridity of modem finance and exposes some of the
deepest normative tensions underlying it.
The Article argues that, from this systemic perspective, the fintech
phenomenon has a broader significance than a "disruption" in the prevailing
modes of, or institutional channels for, delivery of specific financial services. Its
arrival marks a potentially decisive shift in the fundamental political
arrangement underlying the operation of the modem financial system, as it
currently exists in most advanced markets. Not surprisingly, that arrangement is
most easily discernable in the United States, which, for the better part of the last
hundred years or so, has been the world's leader in developing not only largescale capital markets but also the sophisticated legal and regulatory apparatus for
a sustained and systematic oversight of financial markets and institutions. The
U.S. system of financial sector regulation took shape during the New Deal era,
as part of a concerted government response to the economic and political fallout
from the stock market crash of 1929 and the Great Depression that followed it.'o
Today's elaborate scheme of U.S. financial regulation and supervision, directly
or indirectly replicated around the world, continues to rest on the fundamental
norms and policy principles at the core of the New Deal reforms." These deep
underlying norms and principles form what this Article calls the "New Deal
settlement" in the sphere of finance.' 2
As discussed below, the New Deal settlement in finance reflects certain
politically derived judgments about the optimal balance of private freedom and
public control in the financial market.1 3 Under this paradigm, private market
actors retain control over substantive decisions on how to allocate financial
capital to various productive uses and thus the power to determine the overall
volume and structure of financial claims in the system. The public, on the other
hand, bears the primary responsibility for maintaining the overall stability of the
financial system and enabling markets to function smoothly and efficiently.
Government regulation is the indispensable mechanism through which the public
manages the moral hazard built into this arrangement: in essence, regulation
constrains market participants' ability to generate excessive system-wide risks
in pursuit of private profits.' 4

10.

See Saule T. Omarova, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? The Institutional
&

Structure of US. FinancialServices Regulation After the Crisis of 2008, in INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
OF FINANCIAL REGULATION: THEORIES AND INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES 137 (Robin Hui Huang

Dirk Schoenmaker eds., 2014) (detailing the institutional legacy of the New Deal in the financial sector).
11.
See Saule T. Omarova, The Dodd-FrankAct: A New Dealfor a New Age?, 15 N.C.
BANKING INST. 83 (2011) (analyzing the key elements of the regulatory philosophy in the financial
sector).
12.
For the ease of reference, the Article uses this term in a shortened form as simply
the "New Deal settlement." That term, however, refers exclusively to the fundamental pattern of division
of public and private powers and responsibilities in the sphere of finance and not in any other context.
13.
For a discussion of the New Deal settlement's core features, see infra Section I.B.
14.
See id.
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The inherently unstable and contestable nature of this balance is the source
of the fundamental tension at the core of the New Deal settlement. In an
important sense, the entire history of U.S. financial markets and regulation since
the New Deal era has been the history of continuous renegotiation and
readjustment of this public-private boundary, driven by private market actors'
continuous efforts to expand their freedom to create and trade financial claims.
To elucidate these deep-seated systemic dynamics, the Article deliberately
shifts the analytical focus from primary markets, in which firms raise capital by
issuing financial claims, to secondary markets in which such claims trade.
Despite legislators' and regulators' continuing preoccupation with "capital
formation" in primary markets, the financial system's center of gravity has long
since shifted to secondary markets.' 6 Secondary markets in financial assets
currently dwarf primary markets in terms of size, complexity, and systemic
significance." Secondary markets also operate as the principal sites of relentless
financial "innovation" and chronic over-generation of systemic risk." The key
to understanding what drives today's complex financial system, therefore, is to
understand what drives the continuous growth and proliferation of secondary
markets.
Operationalizing this insight, the Article identifies the core mechanisms
and techniques that enable private actors to create and grow continuously and
virtually unconstrained secondary markets for financial risk trading. It argues
that the growth of financial markets is best understood by reference to two
interrelated system-wide transactional practices: (1) continuous synthesizing of
new tradable financial assets and (2) scaling up the volume and velocity of
trading activity in financial markets. The Article breaks down these phenomena
further by showing how private market actors pursue these overarching
objectives via four principal mechanisms: pooling and layering of claims, and
acceleration and compression of trades.' 9
System-wide deployment of these transaction meta-technologies pooling,
layering, acceleration, and compression-enables the constant growth and
complexification of the financial market. By the same token, it magnifies the
extent and urgency of the public's obligation to accommodate privately created
claims and to manage macro-financial risks. Critically, however, the public side
is not always able to keep up with these increased demands by expanding its
regulatory oversight capabilities. In fact, private actors' very success in
synthesizing financial assets and scaling up trading activities often depends on

15.
It is important to emphasize from the outset, however, that this Article does not
purport to present a historical analysis of the New Deal, its intellectual or political origins, or any of its
specific institutional accomplishments.
16.
See infra Section II.A.
17.
See infra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
18.
Id.
19.
See infra Section II.B.2.
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the lack or inefficacy of regulatory controls-a familiar story aptly illustrated by
financial market developments since the early 1980s and the global financial
crisis these developments brought about.20
This Article examines the rise of fintech in the context of this decades-long
process of gradual erosion of the New Deal settlement in finance. It posits that
deciphering the meaning of "fintech revolution" as a macro-financial, systemic
phenomenon requires a deeper understanding of how specific fintech
applications impact the public's capacity to maintain the stability of the macroenvironment. Fintech may present a unique opportunity to correct the
increasingly problematic imbalance between private misallocation of credit and
the public's ability to modulate credit aggregates, or it may further intensify that
imbalance. 2
Refraining the inquiry along these dimensions, the Article argues that the
more established fintech applications to date are already exhibiting signs of
skewing the balance further in favor of private actors' unrestrained freedom to
generate and over-generate financial risk. While it may be too early to draw
definitive conclusions, the recent advances in computing power, cryptography,
data analytics, and machine learning appear poised to amplify the long-lasting,
systemically destabilizing trends in the financial markets. As shown below, new
technological tools enable private market participants to engage in the
continuous synthesizing of crypto-assets that are (a) effectively untethered from,
and thus unconstrained by, any productive activity in the real economy, and (b)
tradable in potentially infinitely scalable virtual markets. What is commonly seen
as the key micro-level advantage of fintech its ability to eliminate transactional
"frictions" and to circumvent traditional market boundaries-also operates to
amplify the system's capacity to fuel financial speculation on an unprecedented
scale.22 On a macro-level, therefore, the key risk posed by fintech lies in its (still
not fully known) potential to exacerbate the financial system's dysfunctional
tendency toward unsustainably self-referential growth.23
From this perspective, the onset of the fintech era marks a crucial political
moment. Invisibly, the new technology is "disrupting" the New Deal settlement
in finance. The nearly century-old arrangement that rigidly separated credit
generation and allocation (an exclusively private right) from credit modulation
and accommodation (an explicitly public responsibility)appears increasingly illsuited for ensuring systemic stability in the emergent world of frictionless
crypto-speculation.24 Accordingly, in trying to make sense of specific

20.
See infra Section I.C.
21.
See Hockett & Omarova, supra note 9. For a detailed post-crisis account of the
importance of structural, as opposed to individual or firm-level, incentives for financial risk-taking, see
Robert C. Hockett, A Fixer-Upperfor Finance, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1213 (2010).
22.
For a detailed discussion, see infra Part III.
23.
See infra Section III.C.
24.
Id.
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technological advances, we must not lose sight of the ultimate systemic
challenge rising in their background: the growing need to rethink the current
public-private boundary in finance.25
The Article is organized as follows. Part I provides a brief overview of
recent fintech developments and places them in the context of what I call the
New Deal settlement in finance. It outlines the defining features of this political
settlement and traces the process of its gradual erosion in recent decades. Delving
deeper into this process, Part II advances a novel conceptual framework for
understanding the fundamental dynamics of secondary markets in financial
instruments. It offers a preliminary taxonomy of the principal mechanisms-or
system-level transaction meta-technologies that enable private market actors
to engage in continuous synthesizing of tradable assets and scaling up of trading
activities. Finally, Part III examines specific fintech applications Bitcoin,
distributed ledger technology, marketplace lending, initial coin offerings (ICOs),
and robo-advising-from the perspective of their potential to amplify the
operation of these core financial market mechanisms. It concludes by drawing
out some of the key systemic implications of these new technologies and,
accordingly, redefining fintech as a public policy challenge of the highest
order.26
I. Fintech as a Challenge to the New Deal Settlement
A. Fintech:A PreliminaryOverview
"Fintech" is an umbrella term that refers to a variety of digital technologies
applied to the provision of financial services and, more generally, developments
in the financial sector. Perhaps the most immediately recognizable symbol of the
fintech era is the rise of private cryptocurrencies, defined generally as "any form
of currency that only exists digitally, that usually has no central issuing or
regulating authority but instead uses a decentralized system to record
transactions and manage the issuance of new units, and that relies on
cryptography to prevent counterfeiting and fraudulent transactions."27 Bitcoin is

25.
For a comprehensive theoretical and normative account of the core public-private
dynamics in finance, see Hockett & Omarova, supranote 9.
26.
It is worth noting here that this Article does not explicitly address such familiar and
undoubtedly important themes in the current discourse on fintech as, for example, protection of customer
data privacy, cybersecurity, application of anti-money laundering rules, or consumer and investor fraud
prevention. Nor does it engage in lengthy discussions of potential public benefits of new technologiesincluding potential uses of technology for regulatory compliance and monitoring purposes-that are easy
to stipulate in the abstract. Furthermore, because the primary thrust of this Article is analytical and
expository, it contains no specific policy recommendations or regulatory proposals. Developing truly
effective policy proposals requires a deeper and more systematic analysis of the problem they purport to
solve. It is the latter, conceptually prior, task that is at the heart of the present project.
27.

Cryptocurrency,

MERRIAM-WEBSTER

DICTIONARY,

https://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/cryptocurrency [https://perma.cc/934D-J3E9]. It is notoriously difficult to draw
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the first cryptocurrency to date that went mainstream, albeit as an investment
asset rather than as a viable substitute for fiat money.28 The Bitcoin network is
built on blockchain technology, which uses a complex algorithm to allow
decentralized verification and recording of each transaction in a publicly
viewable distributed ledger.2 9
Importantly, blockchain-or, more broadly, distributed ledgertechnology potentially allows for a wider range of uses outside simply supporting
specific cryptocurrencies. Thus, Ethereum, a blockchain platform designed to
host an unlimited number of project-specific third-party applications, enables
what are now known as "smart contracts" to automate the execution of a wide
variety of transactions, including the ongoing performance of transacting parties'
obligations. 30 Among other things, "smart contract" algorithms can
automatically disburse payments or transfer title to assets upon the verified
occurrence of specified triggering events. 3' Corporate dividends, interest
payments, insurance payouts, and derivatives collateral management are some
of the areas in which smart contracts potentially offer the most easily discernable
optimization benefits.32
Smart contracts also enable so-called "initial coin offerings," or ICOs, in
which various firms raise capital online by issuing digital tokens, or "coins," that
carry various rights with respect to some future digital product or service the
issuing firms intend to finance and develop. 33 An ICO is essentially a new form

of crowdfunding that, ideally, enables tech startups to raise funds directly from
their user communities. 34 Another form of digital crowdfunding is peer-to-peer,
or marketplace, lending. 35 The original idea behind today's marketplace lending

precise definitional boundaries among different categories of cryptocurrencies, crypto-assets, tokens,
coins, etc. See Daniel Hinge, The Hunt for a Crypto Taxonomy, CENTRAL BANKING (May 4, 2018),
https://www.centralbanking.com/central-banks/currency/digital-currencies/3494476/the-hunt-for-acrypto-taxonomy [https://perma.cc/7VN9-BPJ8] (highlighting definitional difficulties).
28.
For a detailed discussion of Bitcoin, see infra Section III.A.1.
29.
See id.
30.
The term "smart contract" has no clear and uniformly accepted definition.
Depending on context, it may refer either to a computer code stored, verified, and executed on a
blockchain, or to a specific application of that code as an effective substitute for a legal contract. See Josh
Start,
Making Sense
of Blockchain Smart Contracts,
COINDESK
(June
4,
2016),
https://www.coindesk.com/making-sense-smart-contracts [https://perma.cc/UZJ7-JTTK].
31.
Id.
32.
See Salzman, supranote 3.
33.
Many ICOs are functionally equivalent to securities offerings without the
mandatory disclosure and other investor protection features required under U.S. securities laws.
Accordingly, the applicability of federal securities laws and regulations to ICOs has been one of the hottest
legal issues in the fintech space since 2016. See infra Section III.B.1.
34.
See infra note 224 and accompanying text.
35.
Marketplace lending is defined broadly as "any practice of pairing borrowers and
lenders through the use of an online platform without a traditional bank intermediary." Marketplace
Lending,
FDIC
SUPERVISORY
INSIGHTS
(Winter
2015),
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/supervisory/insights/siwinl5/si winter2015article02.pdf [https://perma.cc/CL8H-5RCR].
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platforms, such as LendingClub, SoFi, and others, was to bring together
individual and small-business borrowers and lenders, in order to create a truly
decentralized and direct credit market.36 Not surprisingly, marketplace lending
is often portrayed as a tool of "democratizing" finance by eliminating the need
for banks and other financial intermediaries and by expanding access to credit.
The same "democratizing" impulse is commonly ascribed to the
increasingly popular practice of robo-advising.3 7 Robo-advising denotes
providing online financial advice with minimal or no human participation, using
algorithmic asset allocation and trading models.38 Financial institutions' ability
to replace expensive human advisors with cost-effective computer codes is seen
as the tool of broadening access to previously exclusive wealth management
services: everyone can invest in capital markets with robo-advisors' help.39
As this brief overview shows, all of the currently existing fintech
applications, including cryptocurrencies, blockchain technologies, smart
contracts, digital crowdfunding, and robo-advising, explicitly promise to
"revolutionize" the provision of financial services. New digital technology
unlocks new possibilities for fully frictionless transacting in a completely
virtualized world, without the costs and delays associated with the use of
professional financial intermediaries operating under multiple jurisdictions'
rules. By making financial transactions infinitely faster, easier, and cheaper,
fintech also offers new opportunities for financial inclusion and expanded access
to financial services. In this sense, new technology seems poised to
"revolutionize" finance not only as a matter of transactionalefficiency but also
as a matter of political economy.4 0
Yet, built into this narrative is a crucial presumption-sometimes explicit
but often implicit that the unfolding fintech "revolution" is a politically and
normatively neutral phenomenon, a "win-win" situation not involving hard
public policy choices and trade-offs. The prevailing attitude is to treat most of
the problems commonly discussed in connection with fintech, such as
cybersecurity concerns, network governance lapses, legal uncertainty, or
regulatory gaps, much like natural "growing pains" accompanying society's
triumphant march to a better future: benign temporary glitches ultimately
resolvable through better coding or faster rule-writing.
Finance, however, is not politically or normatively neutral: money and
power are two sides of the same coin. Finance is, and always will be, a matter of

36.
For more on the evolution of marketplace lending, see infra notes 211-223 and
accompanying text.
37.
For a discussion of robo-advising, see infra Section III.B.2.
38.
See infra note 239 and accompanying text.
39.
For a critical examination of this claim, see infra Section III.B.2.
40.
See, e.g., Jeff Horowitz & Eric Scro, Creatingan Open FinancialSystem and Why
Institutionalization is Key, in KPMG, INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF CRYPTOASSETS 11 (Nov. 2018),
https:/assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/us/pdf/2018/11 /institutionalization-cryptoassets.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SCU4-DA2C] (arguing that crypto may help overcome some of the most fundamental
problems of the global financial system).
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utmost and direct public policy significance. Financial arrangements are
fundamentally shaped by, and in turn shape, broader economic and political
structures and choices. "Virtualizing" financial transactions does not change this
basic fact; it only obscures it. Understanding the full significance of the fintech
phenomenon, therefore, requires widening the lens beyond the immediate microtransactional effects of new technology to encompass the essential dynamics of
the financial system as a whole.
To this end, it is critical to start by reminding ourselves of the core political
arrangement that determines the principal structure and operation of today's
financial system. In the U.S. context, it may be referred to as the New Deal
settlement in finance.
B. The New DealSettlement in the FinancialSector
The New Deal era was the pivotal moment in the emergence and
development of the entire system of modem U.S. financial sector regulation and
supervision.4 ' It was during this fateful period that Congress created a
comprehensive system of disclosure-based federal securities regulation and a
federal deposit insurance scheme, institutionalized the separation between banks
and securities firms, and established numerous other legal and regulatory
principles that continue to shape the operation of the U.S. financial system
today.4 2 The purpose of this Article, however, is not to recount the specific
financial sector reforms of that turbulent era but to distill the overarching
principles that informed, guided, and found expression in the multitude of such
reforms. This is what I call the New Deal settlement in finance.43
The New Deal settlement reflects certain politically derived judgments
about the optimal balance of private freedom and public control in the financial
markets. Several key features of the New Deal political settlement defined the
substantive contours of the U.S. regulatory philosophy in the financial sector. At
the highest level of generalization, the New Deal reforms institutionalized the
broad concept of public interest-including public representation and public
enforcement as a legitimate factor in the daily operation of financial markets.
The new regulatory philosophy explicitly acknowledged the overarching need
(i) to protect the public from abusive market practices (as opposed to letting all
market participants fend for themselves), (ii) to ensure that private financial
markets should strive to serve the public's needs (as opposed to private market
participants' needs alone), and (iii) to take the lead role in maintaining the

41.

See MICHAEL S. BARR, HOWELL E. JACKSON & MARGARET E. TAHYAR, FINANCIAL

REGULATION: LAW AND POLICY 47-52 (2016).
42.
See id.; Omarova, supra note 10.
43.
It is worth reiterating here that the Article concerns itself with the New Deal
settlement only in the context of financial markets and regulation and not as a broader phenomenon in
American political history and constitutional development. Nor does it claim to present a historical
analysis of any particular aspect of the New Deal. See supranotes 12-15.
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integrity and healthy functioning of financial markets (as opposed to letting
markets self-regulate). In pushing the public-private line in finance in this
unprecedented way, the New Deal settlement was a political "disruption" of
enormous significance.
And yet it didn't push the line too far into "public control" territory. The
New Deal regulatory reforms left private actors firmly in control over substantive
allocative decisions in financial markets, limiting the area of direct public control
mainly to procedural and infrastructural support of the financial market's
operations. With limited exceptions, the government's principal role was defined
primarily as that of an outside regulator, the source and enforcer of the basic
rules of fair play in financial markets.44 It was envisioned as a largely exogenous
force with a limited mandate to influence private market actors' decisions on
channeling credit and investment flows to specific uses.45 This principal
delineation of public and private roles was reflected in and operationalized
through such important regulatory choices as, for example, a deliberate rejection
of merit-based financial product approval and a systematic preference for
disclosure-based schemes.46 To put it simply, as long as the risks associated with
a particular financial product were adequately disclosed, the government had
little power to prevent the risky product from entering the market.47
As a result of this fundamental line-drawing between public and private
roles in finance, the New Deal regulatory paradigm had an inherently micro,
rather than macro, focus. Because private market participants, with their
informational advantages and individualized economic incentives, were
presumed to be superior decision-makers "on the ground," their judgments on
risks and returns of particular financial transactions and products were not to be
substituted by those of the regulators. To the extent regulators' judgments are,
and are expected to be, driven by generalized public interest considerations
rather than by any specific transactional "efficiencies," however, this policy
choice set the context for a systematic prioritizing of micro-transactional factors

&

44.
Of course, the New Deal era gave rise to many forms of direct government action
inside, rather than merely outside, the ostensibly private financial markets. Perhaps the best example in
this respect was the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), the once-powerful but now nearly
forgotten federal instrumentality that played a critical role in maintaining the functioning of the nation's
financial markets during the Great Depression. The extraordinary nature of this exception, however, only
underscores the general rule. For an in-depth analysis of the RFC's role and institutional legacy, see Robert
C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, Private Wealth and Public Goods: A Case for a NationalInvestment
Authority, 43 J. CORP. L. 437 (2018).
45.
See Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, Public Actors in Private Markets:
Toward a Developmental Finance State, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 103, 113 (2015) [hereinafter Hockett
Omarova, Public Actors]; Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, "Private"Means to "Public"Ends:
Governments as Market Actors, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 53, 54-55 (2014).
46.
For in-depth discussion of financial product approval as a form of macroprudential
regulation, see Saule T. Omarova, License to Deal: MandatoryApproval of Complex FinancialProducts,
90 WASH. U. L. REV. 63 (2012).
47.
See Omarova, supranote 11, at 95-97.
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over macro-systemic ones and of individual action over collective agency. It is
implicitly assumed that, if the former is taken care of, the latter will necessarily
follow. 48

Accordingly, the New Deal paradigm focused expressly on regulating
individual financial firms, licensed and supervised under clearly identified
regimes, based on the types of products they offered and activities they engaged
in. 49 The regulatory boundaries among financial institutions (banks, securities
broker-dealers, insurers, etc.) and financial products (securities, banking
products, insurance, commodity futures, etc.) were drawn in clear categorical
terms. 0 The silo-based regulatory architecture, in which separate administrative
agencies oversee formally separate financial sub-sectors under different statutory
schemes, was an institutional embodiment of this approach."
At the same time, the New Deal reforms have also institutionalized the
public's role as an explicit market backstop "of last resort." Perhaps the most
readily recognizable example of this public safety net is the comprehensive
federal deposit insurance scheme administered by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC).52 Another important example of the public's marketpreserving role is the central bank's expanded emergency authority to prop up
not only banks but also broader financial markets.53 These political choices
functionally transformed the government from a (presumably) exogenous rulemaker and enforcer into a direct financial market participant.5 4 Furthermore,
these choices explicitly put the government the quintessential political actor,

48.
This is a basic logical error known as the fallacy of composition. For a theoretical
and historically grounded account of the importance of macro-, as opposed to micro-, dynamics in
financial markets, see Hockett, supranote 21; and Robert Hockett, Bretton Woods 1.0: A Constructive
Retrievalfor Sustainable Finance, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 401 (2013).
49.
See Omarova, supra note 10. The canonical example of this regulatory philosophy
was the Glass-Steagall Act, which established a system of strict separation between commercial banking
and investment banking. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933).
50.

See

Omarova, supra note

10;

Gov.

ACCOUNTABILITY

OFFICE, FINANCIAL

REGULATION: INDUSTRY CHANGES PROMPT NEED TO RECONSIDER U.S. REGULATORY STRUCTURE (Oct.
2004); Gov. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: FINANCIAL CRISIS LOSSES
AND POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT (Jan. 2013); GRP. OF THIRTY, THE STRUCTURE OF
FINANCIAL SUPERVISION: APPROACHES AND CHALLENGES IN A GLOBAL MARKETPLACE (2008).

51.
See supra note 50.
52.
See generally 12 U.S.C. § 1811 et seq. (2018). The United States was the first
jurisdiction to establish such a comprehensive deposit insurance regime. See Edward J. Kane & Ash
Demirguc-Kunt, Deposit Insurance Around the Globe: Where Does It Work? (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research,
Working
Paper
No.
8493,
2001),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w8493.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EF2R-46N3].
53.
See, e.g., Federal Reserve Act § 13(3), 12 U.S.C. § 344 (2018) (authorizing the
Federal Reserve to provide emergency liquidity support to financial markets, subject to specified
conditions). See also Lender ofMore than Last Resort, FED. RES. BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS: THE REGION

(David
Fettig ed., Dec.
2002), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/~/media/files/pubs/region/0212/lender.pdf[https://perma.cc/8P72-AZEB].
54.
See Hockett & Omarova, Public Actors, supranote 45 (discussing the taxonomy of
roles governments perform in their capacities as market actors).
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the ultimate collective agency in charge of preserving the stable functioning of
financial markets.
In consequence, there was, and still is, deep tension at the heart of the New
Deal regulatory paradigm: it vests substantive control over the allocation of risks
and returns in financial markets in private actors operating on a micro-level and
assigns the responsibility for ensuring financial stability to public actors
operating on a macro-level. Government regulation was designed to counteract
and control the obvious moral hazard built into this system. In this sense,
effective public oversight of financial markets and institutions was (and still is)
critical to maintaining the New Deal political settlement. It is through close
regulation and supervision of financial markets and institutions by specialized
government agencies that the sovereign public was expected to keep profitseeking private market participants from abusing their micro-level freedom to
generate macro-level risks.
The fundamental problem with this approach is that, in practice, allocation
and modulation of credit and money in the financial system are intimately
connected: systemically destabilizing asset price booms are the direct effect of
socially suboptimal allocative decisions by individual market participants.56 The
superficially neat functional separation of public and private, therefore, is
inherently unstable. Beneath an intuitively clear division of functions, there are
complex dynamics, conflicting interests, and ambiguous boundaries.
In effect, it may be said that the entire history of U.S. financial markets and
regulation since the New Deal era has been the history of continuous
renegotiation and readjustment of this delicate balance. Financial institutions and
their clients, searching for higher profits and competitive edge, keep pushing the
line toward greater private freedom to transact, to "complete" the perennially
"incomplete" markets by creating and trading in new financial instruments.
They often do so by exploiting gaps and ambiguities in the existing laws and
regulations and by deliberately structuring transactions to escape the application
of unfriendly legal rules, a technique widely known under the label of
"regulatory arbitrage."5

55.
This essential hybridity is especially visible in the structure and operation of the
modern banking system, which is best understood as a public-private partnership-or a franchise
arrangement. For an in-depth analysis of how this arrangement works in practice, see Hockett & Omarova,
supranote 9.
56.
See id.
57.
A "complete system of markets" is one in which there is a market for every good.
See Mark D. Flood, An Introduction to Complete Markets, 73 FED. REs. BANK OF ST. Louis REV. 32, 32
(1991),
https:/files.stlouisfed.org/files/htdocs/publications/review/91/03/Markets Mar Aprl991.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VB7C-VFR5]. For the original theoretical account, see Kenneth J. Arrow & Gerard
Debreu, Existence ofan Equilibriumfor a Competitive Economy, 22 ECONOMETRICA 265 (1954).
58.
The literature on the nature and role ofregulatory arbitrage in the financial services
sector is too voluminous to cite here. The rise of today's derivatives and repo markets, and the growth of
money market mutual funds, for example, were direct products of regulatory arbitrage and of financial
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This constant injection of privately generated risks into the financial system
creates quantitatively and qualitatively new challenges from the viewpoint of
systemic stability, predominantly the public's responsibility. Inexorably, the
public is in a reactive posture: once capital allocation decisions are made by
private actors operating on a micro-level, the macro-level modulation comes into
play as a principally ex post response.5 9 This fundamental logic both implicitly
shapes, and is reflected in, the widely shared assumptions about the basic
dynamics of finance. We take for granted that markets "evolve" and "innovate"
(the primary, active, positive value-creation side of the public-private equation),
while regulators "respond" and "react" (the secondary, passive, negative harmlimitation side). These assumptions define both the policy and the discursive
agenda. How financial regulators do, or should, respond to privately driven
financial innovation and adjust regulatory tools and objectives to the new
context is one of the perennial questions that preoccupy scholars of financial
markets and institutions.60 What goes unnoticed, however, is that this seemingly
objective description of "how the world works" is itself, to a great extent, a
product of a normative choice as to the relative competencies of private and
public actors in financial markets.6
C. Pre-FintechErosion of the New DealSettlement: A BriefRecap
Technology plays a critical role in this process of continuous renegotiation
and resetting of the public-private balance in finance. It is well known, for
example, that advances in computing and communications technology since the
1980s enabled the rapid growth of increasingly diverse and complex derivatives
markets. Derivatives are bilateral contracts whose value is "derived" from that

firms' desire to circumvent specific regulatory constraints on their activities. For a recent book-length
account of these dynamics, see ERIK GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES, AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (2013).
59.
This is, of course, a generalization. The point here is not to say that every specific
systemic stability enhancing measure is an ex post response to a specific transaction. Agency rules are
prospective in their application. Banking regulation and supervision, in particular, involve regulatory
agencies in private banks' balance-sheet management with the view toward preventing them from failure.
Nevertheless, even in that context, the principal posture of the public oversight is not to substitute its own,
public-interest based, substantive judgment for that of the bank's management in every instance when the
bank is extending a loan or entering into a derivative contract. These types of direct credit-money
allocation decisions are left to private bank managers. Regulatory limitations on individual banks'
leverage, risk concentration, or liquidity position are designed to shape these choices only indirectly and,
in this sense, are fundamentally reactive.
60.
For a recent book-length treatment of this subject, see CRISTIE FORD, INNOVATION
AND THE STATE: FINANCE, REGULATION, AND JUSTICE (2017).

61.
For an in-depth discussion and critique of this traditional delineation of roles in
finance, see Hockett & Omarova, Public Actors, supra note 45; Hockett & Omarova, supra note 9;
Hockett & Omarova, supra note 44; Saule T. Omarova, Bank Governance and Systemic Stability: The
"Golden Share" Approach, 68 ALA. L. REV. 1029 (2017).
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of some other underlying, or reference, asset.6 The commonly encountered
derivatives are linked to commodities, securities, interest rates, or exchange
rates. However, pretty much any quantifiable and, importantly, fluctuating
value can serve as a reference asset. 3 Derivatives enable financial market
participants both to hedge their existing or anticipated risks and to make
essentially speculative bets. While simple derivatives appear to have been in use
even in ancient times, it was only in the 1980s that financial firms were able to
use their newly acquired technological capabilities to scale up derivatives trades
and turn them into one of the fastest growing segments of global financial
markets.64
A similar story unfolded in the market for securitized products.
"Securitization" generally refers to the practice of pooling revenue-generating
assets, such as mortgage or credit card loans, and using the pooled assets as
collateral backing the issuance of debt securities to investors.65 While not a
recent invention, securitization became a major market-driving phenomenon in
the 1980s, in large part because the advances in technology enabled originators
and securitizers of loans to create much larger and more complex pools of
securitizable assets and to manage the risk-return structure of debt securities
backed by such assets. By the early 2000s, the market for these "structured"
asset-backed products, including highly complex multi-layered schemes such as
"collateralized debt obligations" (CDOs), grew to unprecedented levels.66
Moreover, the growth of securitization was intimately connected to the growth

62.
See generally JOHN C. HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES, AND OTHER DERIVATIVES (9th
ed. 2014); R. STAFFORD JOHNSON, INTRODUCTION TO DERIVATIVES: OPTIONS, FUTURES, AND SWAPS 110 (2009).
63.
As a general rule, the more volatile the underlying asset's value, the more lucrative
the related derivatives contract. Accordingly, derivatives contracts may be linked to things like inflation
rates, natural catastrophes, or even financial market volatility itself
64.
There is a voluminous body of scholarly and popular literature detailing the history,
economic functions, legal status, institutional structure, and financial stability implications of derivatives
markets instruments. For a small sample, see Dan Awrey, The Mechanisms of Derivatives Market
Efficiency, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1104 (2016); Saule T. Omarova, The Quiet Metamorphosis: How
Derivatives Changed the "Business ofBanking," 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1041 (2009); Mark J. Roe, The
Derivatives Market's Payment Prioritiesas FinancialCrisis Accelerator, 63 STAN. L. REV. 539 (2011);
Lynn A. Stout, Derivativesand the Legal Origin ofthe 2008 Credit Crisis, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2011).
65.
See Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and Its Discontents: The Dynamics of
FinancialProduct Development, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1553, 1556 (2009); Jonathan C. Lipson, Re:
Defining Securitization, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1229, 1257 (2012).
66.
See generally FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY
REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC
CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES (2011), http://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPOFCIC.pdf [http://perma.cc/T8LE-QL7]; S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 112TH CONG.,
WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE (2011),
http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/ files/Financial Crisis/FinancialCrisisReport.pdf[https://perma.cc/7REBE2Q7].
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of derivatives markets, mainly through the use of credit derivatives to structure
asset-backed claims.67
Both derivatives and structured asset-backed products are heavily
dependent on the capacity of their creators to run increasingly complicated
computer models. 68 The principal economic function of these and many other
complex financial products is to allow for isolating, pricing, and trading specific
risk factors embedded in, or constituting, the same otherwise indivisible asset.
This process of synthetically constructing tradable financial claims out of
deconstructed traditional assets-shares of stock, loans, or commoditiesrequires sophisticated analytical tools and computing power. 69 As a result,
today's highly structured financial products marketed and used as both riskmanagement and risk-taking tools are also, to a great extent, tech products.70
Importantly, however, the technology that enabled derivatives and other
structured finance transactions was proprietary in character: developed and
owned by financial institutions dealing and trading in these markets. That
rendered the tech component of complex financial products less visible and more
subsumed in their overall economic functions and effects. These economic
functions and effects, of course, were often inseparable from the legal or
regulatory functions and effects. Complex financial products are economically
attractive not only because they allow for a more fine-tuned, bespoke tailoring
of risks and returns of financial investments but also because they often lower
the costs of such investments by circumventing specific laws and regulations.
Accordingly, regulatory arbitrage is a strong driver of "innovation" in financial
markets." Much of such innovation is, in fact, little more than a new way of
avoiding regulatory limitations and compliance costs.72 Deregulatory policy
choices, both formal and informal, further magnify and support these strategic
shifts of financial activities from the traditionally "well-lit" regulated areas to
unregulated "shadows" of the same economic markets.73

67.

See S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 66.

68.
See Erik F. Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source: The OutsourcingofFinancial
Regulation to Risk Models and the GlobalFinancialCrisis, 84 WASH. L. REV. 127 (2009).
69.
On the critical systemic significance of market actors' ability to synthesize new
tradable assets, see infra Section II.B.
70.
Such familiar terms as "financial engineering," "quants," "rocket scientists," and
"legal technology" may, on some level, reflect an intuitive recognition of this underlying connection.
71.
See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
72.
See FORD, supra note 60; Dan Awrey, Complexity, Innovation and the Regulation
of Modern FinancialMarkets, 2 HARV. Bus. L. REV. 235 (2012) (discussing supply-side incentives for
financial institutions to engage in socially suboptimal "innovation" as a means of generating short-term
monopoly-like rents).
73.
For in-depth analyses of the hidden deregulation dynamics, see Omarova, supra
note 64 (detailing how the national bank regulator, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, used
informal decision-making tools to expand deposit-taking institutions' powers to trade and deal in
derivatives instruments); Saule T. Omarova, From Gramm-Leach-Bliley to Dodd-Frank: the Unfulfilled
Promise of Section 23A of the FederalReserve Act, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1683 (2011) (detailing how the
Federal Reserve used its informal administrative powers to loosen important statutory restrictions on
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This is in essence the familiar story of the emergence and growth of the
controversial "shadow banking" sector.74 The term "shadow banking" does not
have a firmly defined meaning and refers generally to a variety of financial
markets and activities that mimic the economic substance of bank-like creditmoney creation without being subject to the same kind of regulatory oversight.
Both derivatives and securitization markets are routinely cited as key examples
of shadow banking in action: in both of these markets, various regulated and
unregulated financial institutions continuously generated ultimately
unsustainable levels of leverage and risk.76 This excessive risk-creation was at
the root of the global financial crisis that began in 2008, when the elaborate
system of complex structured products and derivatives sitting on top of risky
subprime mortgages collapsed with a frightening speed.
A brief recap of this well-known narrative helps to highlight the more
fundamental dynamics manifested in the rise of shadow banking: the gradual
erosion of the New Deal settlement, as the contested public-private balance
shifted toward an increasingly greater private freedom to make allocative
decisions determining the types and levels of risk in the financial system, without
the proportionately necessary increase in the public's ability to manage creditmoney aggregates. Moreover, while the sphere of public control over financial
risk-generation diminished, the scope and scale of public accommodation of
privately created liabilities in financial markets both old and new, well-lit and
pitch-dark-dramatically increased over the same period.7 7 The events of 20082009 sharply exposed the practical effects of this fundamental imbalance:
privately created allocative distortions in financial markets led to unsustainable
accumulations of risk and leverage in the system, and the public had to "clean
up" the resulting mess. In this sense, the popular reference to "privatization of

banks' transactions with affiliated entities). For a broader account of the deregulatory dynamics in
financial bubble-bust cycles, see GERDING, supranote 58.
74.
There is a huge literature on shadow banking, especially in the post-2008 era when
the term became synonymous with excessive systemic risk creation. For a small sample of this literature,
see, for example, GERDING, supranote 58, at 395-470; Morgan Ricks, Money and (Shadow) Banking: A
Thought Experiment, 31 REV. OF BANKING & FIN. L. 731 (2012); Tobias Adrian & Hyun Song Shin, The
Shadow Banking System: Implicationsfor FinancialRegulation (Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y. Staff Report No.
382, 2009); Tobias Adrian, Adam B. Ashcraft & Nicola Cetorelli, Shadow Bank Monitoring (Fed. Res.
Bank of N.Y. Staff Report No. 638, 2013); and Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Regulatingthe Shadow
Banking System, 2010 BROOKINGS PAPER ON ECON. ACTIVITY, https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2010/09/2010b bpea gorton.pdf[https://perma.cc/Q4TR-6K8M].
75.
The term was coined by Paul McCulley. Paul McCulley, Teton Reflections, GLOBAL
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2007),

2007

http://www.sfindustry.org/images/uploads/pdfs/Paul%/o20McCulley%/o2OTeton%/o20Reflections%/o20
.p
df [https://perma.cc/E499-GGM8]; see also Bryan Noeth & Rajdeep Sengupta, Is Shadow Banking Really
Banking?, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS: REGIONAL ECONOMIST 8-13 (Oct. 2011).
76.
See sources cited supra note 74. For a more targeted discussion of the specific
mechanisms through which shadow banking amplified credit-money aggregates, see Hockett & Omarova,
supranote 9, at 1175-92.
77.
For a detailed analysis of this inevitable expansion of public accommodation, see
Hockett & Omarova, supranote 9, at 1175-92.
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gains and socialization of losses"" aptly captures the dynamics of erosion of the
New Deal settlement in the financial sector.
The Dodd-Frank Act, the most far-reaching legislative reform in the U.S.
financial sector since the New Deal, was an effort to curb some of the most
visible manifestations of this imbalance. 79 The Act explicitly sought to reinsert
public agency and public interest in finance, among other things, by articulating
the overarching policy goal of protecting systemic financial stability and by
institutionalizing system-wide oversight of the financial sector. 0 Yet, despite
these important measures, the Dodd-Frank Act did not alter the substantive basis
of the New Deal settlement, discussed above.8 ' Under the evolving post-crisis
regime, much like in the pre-crisis era, the public still does not have any direct
involvement in or control over allocation of financial capital, a traditional sphere
of private dominance. In fact, by reconfirming this pre-crisis understanding of
the relative competencies of private and public actors in financial markets, the
Act further exacerbated the deep-seated tension within the New Deal paradigm.
D. Fintech and the New Deal Settlement: Reframing the Inquiry
It is in this context that the fintech revolution began to disrupt the way
financial transactions are conducted and financial services are delivered.8 2 Its
game-changing potential, however, extends beyond the pure transactional
aspects of finance. This Article argues that fintech is emerging as a powerful new
tool for resetting the current public-private balance in finance. Does it offer a
unique opportunity to correct the structurally destabilizing imbalance between
private generation of financial risk, on the one hand, and public accommodation
of such privately generated risk, on the other? Or will it operate to intensify this
imbalance? If it is the latter, does that mean that fintech is going to be the
proverbial last nail in the coffin of the New Deal settlement in finance?

78.
See, e.g., Joseph Stiglitz, U.S. Does Not Have Capitalism Now, CNBC (Jan. 19,
2010),https://www.cnbc.com/id/34921639 [https://perma.cc/U8HR-TDYV].
79.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L.
111-203, 124 Sta. 1376 (2010).
80.

See DAVID SKEEL, THE NEw FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-

FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES (2010); Omarova, supra note 11.
81.
See supra Section I.B. Thus, the old silo-based structure of the financial sector
oversight remains almost entirely intact. See Omarova, supra note 10. The new macroprudential
regulatory regime essentially utilizes scaled up microprudential tools. See Robert Hockett, The
MacroprudentialTurn: From Institutional 'Safety and Soundness' to Systematic 'FinancialStability' in

FinancialSupervision, 9 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 201 (2015). And, to the extent Dodd-Frank seeks to restrain
potential risks posed by derivatives and other structured products, it does so only indirectly, through
demanding greater disclosure, encouraging standardization and centralized clearing, and incentivizing
more prudent risk underwriting by private parties. See Omarova, supranote 11, at 96-97; Awrey, supra
note 64.
82.
See supra Section I.A.
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These questions help to reframe the key inquiry into the nature and systemic
impact of fintech. Ultimately, understanding fintech as a systemic phenomenon
(as opposed to a mere collection of discrete finance-related applications of digital
technology) requires analyzing whether, and how, specific fintech applications
affect the public's capacity to maintain the stability of the macro-environment.
This reframing allows us to overcome the current fragmentation of the fintech
debate by redirecting it away from the familiar but largely unproductive
themes.83 It also enables us to situate fintech in the broader analytical and
normative context as an integral part of, or the latest phase in, the decades-long
process of gradual renegotiation of the New Deal settlement in finance.
The fundamental continuity in this process is hard to miss. Despite its
disruptive appearance, today's digital technology largely facilitates and
amplifies certain long-standing trends in modem finance. In this sense, it is a
continuation of the core pre-fintech dynamics in financial markets, whose
cumulative effect to date has been the gradual "unsettling" of the New Deal
settlement. At the same time, however, qualitatively new technological tools can
elevate these built-in tensions to a qualitatively new level, potentially demanding
a qualitatively new political settlement.
This means that fintech is properly conceptualized not so much as
"revolutionizing" finance as providing new channels for the operation of the
fundamental financial market dynamics predating it. From this perspective, it is
important to resist the obvious temptation to focus on superficially novel, microtransactional aspects of fintech. In the final analysis, the systemic significance
of the unfolding fintech revolution is in its (not yet fully known) potential to
redefine the basic patterns of interaction between the private and the public sides
of modem finance.
Accordingly, the first step toward understanding fintech as a systemic rather
than as transactional, or micro-level, phenomenon is to re-examine from the new
vantage point the underlying drivers of the changing public-private balance in
finance. The project of decoding the fintech revolution thus begins with
reassessing what we already know about the functioning, and malfunctioning, of
financial markets and institutions, in light of what we are learning about new
finance-related technologies.
So, what exactly do we know about the functional dynamics of finance?

83.
One example of such a familiar theme is so-called "disintermediation" of incumbent
financial institutions by fintech entrants. While these types of shift in the structure of specific market
segments undeniably raise important regulatory issues on a more granular level, conceptualizing the
broader fintech dynamics in terms of"disintermediation" is needlessly reductionist.
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II. The Logic of Financial Innovation and the Erosion of the New Deal
A. Focusing the Inquiry: Secondary Markets in FinancialInstruments
As discussed above, one of the key features of the New Deal settlement in
finance was that it left the critical task of credit- or capital-allocation to private
market actors.84 In this system, private actors have the ultimate power to decide
which financial instruments to sell or to buy, or which risks to generate or to take
on, and at what price. The government generally does not control these decisions,
as long as the relevant private parties make required disclosures and otherwise
conduct their businesses in accordance with the applicable rules.
Instead, under the terms of the New Deal political bargain, the
government's principal role is to provide macro-stability, not only by regulating
but also by directly backing private financial markets.86 This public
accommodation of privately created risks and liabilities is the defining dynamic
in a modem financial system: one that can be traced throughout all of that
system's interconnected layers and that ultimately underwrites the growth of
putatively private capital markets.
Inevitably, however, public accommodation also creates powerful
structural incentives for over-generation of financial risks by rent-seeking
private parties." It incentivizes the creation and proliferation of financial
products-and the related growth of secondary markets in which such financial
products are traded. This built-in incentive for constant reproduction and growth
of secondary markets is a fundamental, and fundamentally underappreciated,
driver of what is routinely understood as "financial innovation."
Standard accounts of finance, by contrast, use primary markets as the
archetypal setting in which "financial intermediation" takes place: the savers of

84.
See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
85.
This is true despite the fact that federal laws and regulations impose limits on the
ability of the least sophisticated, and therefore most vulnerable, financial market participants to invest in
certain high-risk financial instruments. For example, under the U.S. regime of securities regulation, retail
investors are not allowed to invest in privately placed securities pursuant to SEC Rule 144A, which limits
permissible purchasers to institutional investors. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.144A (2018). Similarly, retail
investors cannot invest directly in hedge funds, private equity funds, or other funds exempt from
registration and regulation as "investment companies" under the Investment Company Act of 1940. See
15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7) (2018). All of these investor-protection measures, however, operate primarily to
draw the intra-sectoral lines separating more strictly regulated retail markets from institutional, or
wholesale, markets subject to much lighter oversight. They do not-nor were they ever intended to put
the regulators in charge of making specific investment choices on behalf of retail market participants.
86.
See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
87.
For a detailed explanation of what I mean by "public accommodation," a capacious
concept that goes far beyond federal deposit insurance or bank bailouts, see Hockett & Omarova, supra
note 9. It is this public accommodation-often unseen or taken for granted-that fundamentally enables
and underwrites the financial flows in the system: from the banking sector, through capital markets, to the
outer edges of the constantly evolving "shadow banking." See id.
88.
See id.
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money extend loans or invest in the equity of the users of funds, with the
mediating help of a professional financial intermediary.89 The intermediary
such as a bank, a securities dealer, or an investment fund is said to "transform"
all or some of the key risk attributes embedded in the transaction. This is what is
typically described as maturity, liquidity, or credit risk transformation: a set of
functions typically performed by banks, the quintessential "intermediaries," and
replicated in part by non-bank financial institutions.90
This narrative, which remains the dominant intellectual framework for
analyzing the financial system dynamics, is fundamentally misleading. 9' Among
other things, it masks the independent significance, and indeed defacto primacy,
of secondary-market dynamics in the modem financial system. In primary
market transactions, the entrepreneurial users of capital issue securities and incur
loans primarily for the purpose of funding non-financial economic enterprise,
thereby taking capital out of the financial system and putting it to productive use
in the real, i.e., non-financial, economy.92 This feature of primary markets
operates as the key safety valve that keeps the financial system from outgrowing
the economy's capacity to absorb capital at any given moment. In this sense,
primary markets' ability to generate financial claims, and thus financial risks, is
inherently subject to certain externally determined limits.
In the vast majority of real-life financial transactions, however, market
players borrow and issue various financial claims in order to invest in other
financial claims. Unlike primary market issuances used to fund companies'
investments in operatingassets, secondary market transactions fund investments
in financial assets. This seemingly trivial difference has critical consequences.
Thus, largely as a result of the legal and financing technologies developed
specifically for this purpose, there is no natural (i.e., independent from the

89.
This is, literally, a textbook understanding of "financial intermediation." See Zvi
BODIE & ROBERT C. MERTON, FINANCE 22-23 (2000); RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 37 (5th ed. 2013); BARBARA CASU ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO BANKING 18
(2006); STEPHEN G. CECHETTI & KERMIT SCHOENHOLTZ, MONEY, BANKING, AND FINANCIAL MARKETS
39 (3d ed., 2008); STUART I. GREENBAUM & ANJAN V. THAKOR, CONTEMPORARY FINANCIAL
INTERMEDIATION 55-58 (2007); KENT MATHEWS & JOHN THOMPSON, THE ECONOMICS OF BANKING 33
(2005).
90.
References to credit, maturity, and liquidity transformation as the core functional
features of banking and, by extension, "shadow banking" are too ubiquitous to cite. What is interesting
for the purposes of the present discussion is that this conceptual apparatus presupposes a specific purpose
behind the intermediated transaction: moving capital from the investor-saver's hands into the hands of a
productive user-entrepreneur. While not stated explicitly, an implicit presumption here is that the user is
seeking funds for some legitimate economic use and not for a speculative financial reinvestment.
91.
For a detailed explanation of why the "financial intermediation" orthodoxy is
fundamentally misleading, see Hockett & Omarova, supra note 9.
92.
Of course, as business entities, financial institutions also raise capital by issuing
securities in primary markets or borrowing money. The point here is that, in the standard picture of how
capital markets operate, companies issue equity and raise debt in order to support or expand their "realeconomy" business operations that generate jobs and wealth. This is the implicit normative justification
for financial intermediation as a socially valuable activity. It is difficult to overestimate the significance
of this implicit normative assumption.
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operation of the financial market itself) limit on the volumes of financial claims
(i.e., financial liabilities)traded in secondary markets. In principle, an unlimited
number of market participants can enter into an unlimited number of secondary
market transactions involving an unlimited variety of financial claims and
liabilities. To the extent these privately created claims/liabilities are publicly
accommodated, either directly or indirectly, they amplify both private market
participants' rents and the public's aggregate risk exposure potentially
indefinitely.
This basic relationship explains why today's secondary markets in financial
instruments are the principal sites of both relentless transactional "innovation"
and chronic over-generation of systemic risk.93 It also explains why secondary
markets in financial assets currently dwarf primary markets in terms of size,
complexity, and systemic significance. 94 This is both a structural and a functional
imbalance. In theory, secondary markets' main function is to support and
facilitate primary capital markets by providing liquidity, price discovery, and
risk-shifting (including exit) opportunities for primary market participants. 95 In
practice, secondary market trading often determines the terms and volumes of
primary issuances of financial claims. The rapid rise of unsustainably risky
subprime mortgage lending in the early 2000s, in response mainly to the rising
demand for such loans as the raw material for MBSs and CDOs, provides a vivid
example of these inverted dynamics. 96
Yet, the significance of this shift in the financial system's center of gravity
from capital-raising in primary markets to risk-trading in secondary markets has
not been fully appreciated and examined in the academic and policy discussions
to date. Even in the post-crisis era, the "financial intermediation" discourse
effortlessly glides over the fundamental differences between primary and
secondary market dynamics, blending them together under the superficially

93.
It is telling, for example, that even financial asset classes traditionally and
functionally viewed as not designed for, or amenable to, secondary market trading are currently traded in
burgeoning secondary markets. Market liquidity is quickly becoming a universal attribute of all financial
claims. See, e.g., Javier Espinoza, Secondary Private Equity Deals Near Record, FIN. TIMES (July 30,
2017), https://www.ft.com/content/2f844682-7507-1le7-a3e8-60495fe6ca71
[https://perma.cc/N2FF343Z] (describing record levels of secondary market trading in traditionally illiquid private equity
investments).
94.
See, e.g.,World Federation of Exchanges, 2017Full Year Market Highlights(Feb.
15,
2018),
https://www.worldexchanges.org/storage/app/media/research/Market%20highlights/WFE%/ 020FY%/o202017%/o2OMarket%/o20
Highlights.pdf [https://perma.cc/2S8L-N8NN] (providing a statistical breakdown of annual trading
volumes on global exchanges).
95.
This Article does not dispute the fact that, on a micro-transactional level, secondary
trading functions as a critical price discovery and liquidity creation mechanism. The point here is that,
alongside these well-known and much discussed benefits of vibrant secondary market trading, there are
also far less salutary and potentially far more publicly salient-macro-systemic dynamics built into
these markets' operation.
96.

See sources cited supra note 66; GARY GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND:

THE PANIC OF 2007 (2008).
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descriptive labels of various balance-sheet "transformation" functions.9 7 Within
these discursive parameters, the principal focus of the mainstream policy debate
is on potential means of fortifying financial intermediaries' balance sheets,
whose inherent fragility is presumed to be a necessary feature of a thriving
financial system. This normative and conceptual stance, in turn, heavily favors
self-consciously technocratic approaches to both analyzing developments in
financial markets and framing regulatory responses.
To overcome this persistent myopia, and to develop a fuller and deeper
understanding of the systemically destabilizing logic of financial innovation, it
is necessary to refocus the inquiry on the core dynamics in secondary markets
for financial products. In doing so, it is important to move beyond the familiar
descriptions of maturity or liquidity "transformations" appearing on, or off,
various balance sheets. Instead of dissecting how various firms "intermediate"
in various transactional contexts, we should shift our efforts toward identifying
and examining the principal mechanisms and techniques that enable private
actors to create and grow-continuously and virtually unconstrained
secondary markets for financial risk trading. 98 Constructing a taxonomy of these
secondary market mechanisms serves a particularly significant purpose in the
context of this Article: it provides a conceptual framework for analyzing the
potential impact of specific fintech applications on the long-term stability and
resilience of the financial system.99
B. The Mechanisms ofSecondary Market Proliferation:A Preliminary
Taxonomy
As argued above, the fundamental division of roles built into the New Deal
settlement creates structural incentives for the disproportionate growth of
secondary markets in tradable financial assets.' The bulk of these tradable
assets are "produced" for reasons that have little to do with "capital formation"
(or canonical capital allocation) in primary markets. To put it simply, financial
products are bundles of financial risks and returns manufactured by financial
institutions for sale to other market participants, mainly portfolio investors or
managers.
From a micro-level transactional perspective, this is typically viewed as a
valuable financial service. We are all familiar with the standard vocabulary that
97.
"Maturity" or "liquidity" transformation is the same balance-sheet phenomenon in
any transactional setting. In the canonical primary-market context of banking, this structural balance-sheet
fragility is believed to serve a socially beneficial purpose, thus justifying an explicit public backup for
banks. The same logic is then easily extended to the same types of balance sheet fragility resulting from
secondary market activities.
98.
For the ease of reference, and unless otherwise specified, the following discussion
will refer to secondary markets in financial instruments as simply "financial markets."
99.
See infra Part III.
100.
See supra notes 87-96 and accompanying text.
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'

conveys this normative assessment in terms of "providing liquidity,"
"completing markets," "discovering prices," "enabling diversification and risk
management," or "creating portfolio-enhancement opportunities." From a
macro-level systemic perspective, however, the principal consequence of this
continuous manufacturing of financial products is the continuous injection of
privately created financial risks into the system. Yet, we do not currently have a
sufficiently extensive and well-established vocabulary to articulate this systemic
perspective as a valid counterpoint to the dominant transactional view of
financial markets' operation.' 0
Developing such a vocabulary is no easy task. It requires taking a fresh look
at the familiar phenomena in an effort to identify important overarching trends
and dynamics that were either unnoticed or unappreciated in previous
accounts.' 02 It requires a new narrative that helps to explain how, and through
which mechanisms, secondary markets in financial instruments are able to grow
and proliferate. 0 3 As the first step in this direction, this Article offers a
preliminary taxonomy of core dynamics operating in secondary markets for
financial instruments.1 04

1. The Market's Modus Operandi: Synthesizing and Scaling Up
At the most abstract level, the growth of financial markets is best
understood by reference to two interrelated practices: (1) synthesizing financial
assets and (2) scaling up transactional activity. To put it simply, both the scope
and the scale of financial markets increase when (1) more products can be
purchased and sold, and (2) more trades can be made in these markets.
The practice of synthesizing financial assets typically involves creating
new types of financial claims out of the existing ones. Some of the most basic
and familiar examples include creating tradable stock indices, writing options on
gold or shares of common stock, securitizing loans, and even setting up mutual

&

101.
In our previous work, Robert Hockett and I have begun this project of developing
a new conceptual vocabulary of modern finance as a systemic phenomenon. See, e.g., Hockett
Omarova, supra note 9; Hockett & Omarova, Public Actors, supranote 45.
102.
See sources cited supra note 101.
103.
There is, of course, a well-known (though not entirely uncontested) narrative of
how various market innovations in recent decades-including money market mutual funds, wholesale
derivatives and repo markets, and complex securitized products-emerged in response to, and were
enabled by, specific legal and regulatory developments. See supra Section I.C. This Article neither
replicates nor challenges that story. Instead, it seeks to take the analysis to a higher level of abstraction by
drawing out the broader-more fundamental and unifying-dynamics behind these and many other
developments.
104.
Any attempt to construct such a taxonomy inevitably runs into various definitional
and boundary-drawing difficulties. The constant growth and complexification of financial markets is a
multi-level process, with a seemingly infinite variety of elements and factors interacting in a seemingly
infinite variety of ways. It is nearly impossible to isolate any specific element or factor with surgical
precision. Instead, the focus of the present taxonomy-building exercise is on the fundamental logic behind
this multitude of factors.
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funds. In all of these cases, a relatively small range of traditional financial assets,
including common stock, corporate bonds, loans, or commodities, serve as the
base on which a potentially unlimited number of new types of financial claims
are created. Importantly, the standard economic logic of supply and demand does
not constrain this process. An increasing supply of tradable assets-or items on
the menu of choices available to financial market participants generates an
increasing demand for them, which in turn incentivizes more assetsynthesizing.' And leverage plays the critical role in enabling this iterative
supply-demand pattern.' 06
The resulting proliferation of tradable financial claims is itself an important
measure, and a determinant, of the quantitative growth of financial markets. The
concept and practice of "scaling up" (i.e., increasing the volume and velocity of
transacting) is another fundamental determinant of such growth. Scaling up is
achieved through a wide variety of means. Market infrastructure and
transactional technologies are of special importance in this respect. For example,
centralized trading platforms (formally registered exchanges, alternative trading
networks, or dealer-run private pools), clearinghouses, and payment systems all
enable far greater volumes of trading to take place at greater speeds than would
otherwise be achievable. Similarly, greater standardization of financial
instruments helps to increase the volume of trading, at times dramatically, as in
the case of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA)
documentation for derivatives contracts. 0 7 The ISDA example also shows how
targeted changes in the applicable legal regimes can effectively unlock the
growth of entire markets for financial products.'s Finally, algorithmic trading is
perhaps the most readily available example of rapid rise in the velocity (and, by
extension, volume) of transactions as a result of the sheer expansion in
technological capacity.1 09
Synthesizing financial assets and scaling up financial transactions are two
fundamentally systemic practices, universal modes of operation at the very core
of financial markets' logical design. Not surprisingly, they both have profound

105.
See sources cited supra note 72.
106.
In that sense, today's high finance may be said to follow the Starbucks business
model, in which the constant invention and marketing of new, intentionally and carefully differentiated,
products creates its own demand. Just like the Starbucks designer beverages, most complex financial
products are made using the same basic ingredients. Leverage, of course, functions much like caffeine in
that it keeps everyone coming back for more.
107.
See Complete ISDA Documentation Package, INT'L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES
ASS'N,
https://www.isda.org/book/complete-isda-documentation-package
[https://perma.cc/95C6C7W9].
108.
This refers specifically to ISDA's successful campaign to secure preferential
treatment of derivatives under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, as well as under many other jurisdictions'
insolvency laws. See Steven L. Schwarcz & Ori Sharon, The Bankruptcy-Law Safe Harbor for
Derivatives:A Path-DependenceAnalysis, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1715 (2014).
109.
For a general overview of algorithmic trading and issues it raises under U.S.
securities laws, see, e.g., Steven R. McNamara, The Law and Ethics of Algorithmic Trading, 17 MINN.
J.L. SC. & TECH. 71 (2016); Yesha Yadav, How Algorithmic Trading Undermines Efficiency in Capital
Markets, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1607 (2015).
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structural implications. Thus, the introduction of new financial products often
leads to the emergence of new specialized markets in which they are traded. New
actors may enter these newly created markets, both on the sell and on the buy
sides, while the established financial institutions may assume new roles in them.
New patterns of market concentration and systemic interdependencies take
shape. Via the multitude of specific transactional channels through which the
twin imperatives of synthesizing and scaling up operate, the financial market
grows not only bigger and faster but also more structurally complex.
It is, of course, impossible and ultimately unnecessary to enumerate all of
these specific channels. It is nevertheless helpful, for analytical purposes, to
identify the key mechanisms market participants use to synthesize financial
assets and to scale up financial transactions.
2. The Four Mechanisms of Synthesizing Assets and Scaling Up Trading
Activity
At first approximation, there are four such mechanisms that may be
broadly and inevitably somewhat imprecisely termed "pooling," "layering,"
"acceleration", and "compression." These analytical categories refer not to any
particular type of product or transaction but rather to system-level operational
principles, or core techniques that enable financial markets' continuous
reproduction and expansion. In this sense, each of these categories may be seen
as a transactional meta-technology, an embedded system functionality
supporting a wide variety of individual applications.
a. Pooling
Pooling and layering are closely related, though conceptually distinct,
mechanisms of synthesizing financial assets and scaling up trading. As used here,
"pooling" denotes the familiar technique of combining multiple financial assets
with certain shared characteristics, for the purpose of creating a new set of
financial claims backed by, or determined by reference to, the resulting asset
pool. This is perhaps the most ubiquitous technique in finance. Mutual funds and
other collective investment vehicles are products of explicit pooling of other
financial instruments-corporate stocks, bonds, and other claims issued in
primary markets-in a portfolio used to back the issuance of fund shares to
investors. Shares issued by individual funds, in turn, can be pooled in a so-called
fund-of-funds (FoF) portfolio backing the issuance of the FoF shares." 0
Benchmarking and creation of indices constitute a similarly ubiquitous,
albeit less directly visible, system-level method of pooling securities issued in

110.
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e.g.,
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primary markets for purposes of synthesizing new tradable assets in secondary
markets."' Among other things, major stock indices, like the S&P 500 or the
Wilshire 5000, are used as benchmarks for and therefore enable the emergence
of-a wide variety of mutual and exchange-traded funds (ETFs) that track their
benchmark index values."12
b. Layering
The last two examples of pooling, FoF and indices, also illustrate the role
of another transaction meta-technology, which may be called layering. I use the
term "layering" to refer to the technique of synthesizing financial assets in a
manner that creates a chain of hierarchically linked claims, so that the
performance of each new asset "layer" is determined by reference to the
combined performance of pooled financial assets underlying it.
As this description makes clear, the layering technique often involves
pooling, which makes these categories difficult to separate neatly. Nevertheless,
as pooling is repeated in several consecutive rounds, the distinct systemic
implications of the resulting multi-layered structure built on the same set of
underlying claims become increasingly pronounced. It is easy to see, for
instance, how shares in a particular investment fund can get bundled with other
funds' shares in the first-layer FoF, whose shares in turn get bundled with other
FoF shares in the second-layer FoF portfolio, whose shares then get bundled with
yet another set of FoF shares in the third-layer FoF, and so on. At each level, an
entirely new crop of tradable fund shares is created, regardless of whether or not
there are any additional issuances of corporate securities in the primary market.
Securitization provides an even more vivid example of synthesizing new
tradable assets via pooling and layering. In a typical securitization, a special
purpose vehicle (SPV), which holds a portfolio of loans or other revenueproducing assets, issues tradable asset-backed bonds (ABS).11 3 These ABS are
then re-bundled with other ABS in the next layer of securitization, such as a
CDO, which issues several tranches of its own bonds. These bonds are then used
as collateral backing bonds issued in a further layer of securitization, so-called
CDO-squared, followed by CDO-cubed, and so on." 4
Derivatives provide yet another canonical example of how the layering
mechanism is used both to synthesize new assets and to scale up market trading.
Derivatives are contingent claim contracts that determine counterparties' rights

111.
For a discussion of the systemic function of benchmark prices and indices, see
Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, Systemically SignificantPrices, 2 J. FIN. REG. 1 (2016).
112.
See Vladislav Sushko & Grant Turner, The Implications of Passive Investingfor
Securities
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https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r qtl8O3j.pdf[https://perma.cc/DH4C-FQ4X].
113.
See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
114.
See sources cited supra note 65.
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and obligations by reference to the changes in the value of specified underlying
assets." 5 Because the underlying asset is merely a reference point for calculating
contractual payouts, there is no theoretical limit on counterparties' ability to
enter into as many derivatives contracts as they desire, on any terms they
choose.1 6 In this sense, derivatives are the ultimate tools for synthesizing a
potentially infinite number of tradable financial products on top of any single
underlying asset.
Indexing and benchmarking, mentioned above in connection with pooling,
also allow for layering of tradable assets in a manner similar to derivatives. A
major stock or commodity index, for example, enables the creation of a wide
range of tradable products tracking it."'
All of the examples above underscore two key features of layering as an
embedded system-level functionality.
First, layering enables a finite quantity of existing financial claims to serve
as the base on which potentially infinite quantities of new financial claims can
be produced. Thus, layering significantly blunts, if not eliminates, the
fundamental structural constraint on the growth of secondary financial markets:
the exogenously limited volume of instruments issued in the primary markets.
Second, layering produces highly complex interdependencies among the
seemingly discrete assets and markets. Financial assets that constitute a single
product chain do not have to be linked other than through value-derivation: they
don't have to be issued by the same or similar entities or reference same or
similarly sourced cash flows. The many different layers of financial products
may be inherently connected, yet the precise patterns of correlation among their
values may be difficult to discern.
c. Acceleration
While pooling and layering operate as the essential determinants of
financial markets' structural complexity, the most visible and direct role of
acceleration and compression is to amplify and sustain the growing volume and
velocity of trading.
Acceleration occurs whenever the speed of transacting is increased (the
velocity of trading), thus allowing more trades to be executed (the volume of

115.
116.

See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
In practice, of course, there are various limits on that ability, including regulatory

ones.
117.
For instance, the emergence of specialized commodity price indices in the late
1990s-early 2000s has been identified as a major factor behind the surge in financial investors'
participation in commodities markets and the related growth of trading in commodity-linked financial
instruments. See Scott H. Irwin & Dwight R. Sanders, Index Funds, Financialization, and Commodity
Futures Markets, 33 APP. ECON. PERSP. & POL'Y 1 (2011); Ing-Haw Cheng & Wei Xiong, The
Financializationof Commodity Markets (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19642,
2013), http://www.nber.org/papers/wl9642 [https://perma.cc/ENR9-LE2X].
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trading). Perhaps the most easily recognizable example of acceleration as a
mechanism of scaling up financial transactions is algorithmic, or high-frequency,
trading (HFT). HFT is a trading strategy that uses complex algorithms to execute
trades at speeds far exceeding human ability. In essence, HFT uses quantitative
investment programs to take extremely short-term positions in equities,
currencies, and any other electronically tradable financial instruments, and to
move in and out of such positions as a way of capturing extremely small gains
on every trade." 8 By definition and design, HFT strategies dramatically, and
successfully, accelerate and amplify trading activity in the relevant markets." 9
The acceleration mechanism also works in less obvious ways, often in
conjunction with the pooling and layering mechanisms. The very act of
synthesizing a new tradable asset may help to increase the aggregate volume and
velocity of market transactions. The creation of a new asset eliminates
potentially significant transactional costs of placing multiple trades that would
otherwise be required in order to achieve the same economic exposure. It makes
trading faster and cheaper relative to trading in the underlying assets themselves,
which in turn leads to surging levels of trading activity. Indexing, derivatives,
securitizations, and many other financial instruments and market practices
exemplify these dynamics.
Standardizing tradable instruments and trading practices is another
important tool of accelerating financial transactions. The logic of this
acceleration tool is simple: eliminating idiosyncratic variations in the key
economic terms of a particular category of financial products significantly
reduces the amount of time and resources that need to be spent on each individual
trade. By establishing a common baseline, it also makes easier and faster to craft
bespoke varieties of the same product, if need be.' 20 In short, secondary markets
need standardization because of its transaction-boosting potential:
standardization means faster trades, and more of them.
d. Compression
I use the term "compression" to refer generally to the technique of
aggregating and compacting risk exposures and obligations associated with

&

118.
See Irene Aldridge, What Is High-Frequency Trading, After All?, HUFFINGTON
POST
(July
8,
2010),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/irene-aldridge/what-is-high-frequencytr_b_639203.html [https://perma.cc/Z9Z5-MVMA].
119.
Id.
120.
As mentioned above, a well-known example of this kind is ISDA's success in
creating an industry-wide set of standard documentation for over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives. See
supranotes 107-108 and accompanying text. A much earlier and equally powerful example comes from
the New Deal era, when the newly established Federal Housing Administration (FHA) used its power as
the national provider of mortgage default insurance to encourage the adoption of a 30-year fixed-rate
mortgage loan as the new industry standard. The FHA's standard-setting actions played a critical role in
facilitating the subsequent creation of the national secondary market for home loans. See Hockett
Omarova, Public Actors, supra note 45, at 133-34.
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multiple trades in a manner that defacto transforms them into a single economic
transaction.
In this sense, it is broader than "trade compression," a term of art denoting
a common practice in derivatives trading that, quite simply, involves reducing
the number of derivatives contracts while keeping the same net economic
exposure.' 2 ' In a typical compressed trade, several derivative contracts between
the same counterparties are torn up and replaced with a single contract with a
reduced (often, quite significantly) notional amount.' 22 Compressing simplifies
a complex transactional pattern by extracting and operationalizing its aggregate
economic effect on the counterparties and reducing their gross risk exposures.
By the same token, however, compression effectively hides the actual volume of
transacting that took place between these counterparties. While the former is the
intended micro-level transactional effect of compression, the latter is its less
obvious but significant macro-level effect.
The same basic principle operates in the broader market context through
the common practice of netting. Generally, netting involves offsetting the mutual
payment obligations of transacting parties in order to facilitate the back-office
process of clearing and settling multiple trades between them. 2 3 Netting does
not directly generate any new financial liabilities or assets: it merely simplifies
their ultimate settlement by eliminating unnecessary flows of funds and
associated frictions in the process. This optimizing and risk-reducing function of
netting is well known and widely acknowledged.1 24
By replacing multiple gross transfers due throughout the day with a single
net transfer at the end of it, however, netting also enables a far greater amount of
trading to take place. From that perspective, the widespread use of netting and
trade compression has an important, and routinely under-appreciated, systemic
effect: it empowers financial market participants to engage in secondary market
trading on a far greater scale, and at far greater speeds, than would be sustainable
in the less forgiving world of gross settlement of trading obligations.1 25 In this
121.

See

Trade Compression, DERIVATIVES

DOCUMENTATION

(Nov. 20, 2015),

https://www.derivsdocu.com/blog/2015/11/20/trade-compression
[https://perma.cc/2XPW-32VJ]
(explaining trade compression in over-the-counter derivatives markets).
122.
Trade compression can also be done on a multilateral basis. Id.
123.
Netting is also used to offset other obligations, such as those related to the posting
of collateral under derivatives or repo agreements.
124.
There is a vast literature, both academic and industry-produced, explaining the
advantages of netting from the perspective of reducing credit, settlement, liquidity, and other risks. See,
&

e.g., Netting and Offsetting: Reporting Derivatives Under U.S. GAAP and Under IFRS, INT'L SWAPS

DERIVATIVES ASS'N (May 2012), https://www.isda.org/a/veiDE/offsetting-under-us-gaap-and-ifrs-may2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/L959-XFKH].
125.
A related form of compression is so-called portfolio margining, a common market
practice that allows for the netting of certain positions in a portfolio of derivatives or other financial
instruments for purposes of calculating minimum collateral requirements. In simple terms, portfolio
margining seeks to align the amount of required collateral with the net market risk of the portfolio, as
opposed to calculating margin requirements for individual positions. See Kenneth M. Rosenzweig, An
Introduction to Portfolio Margining, 26 FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP. (Dec. 2006). As a practical
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sense, compression is more than simply a risk-reducing micro-level application:
it is a system-level functionality for scaling up secondary markets in financial
instruments.
To sum up, it is the system-wide operation of these four closely related
transactional techniques (pooling, layering, acceleration, and compression) that
empowers and sustains continuous quantitative growth and qualitative
complexification of modem financial markets. These are also the enabling
dynamics of what is routinely labeled "financial innovation."1 26 Much of that
innovation is attributable to the iterative application of pooling, layering,
acceleration, and compression tools in some new context or with the help of
some new technology.1 27

C. Systemic Implications ofSecondary Market Proliferation
Analyzing the process of continuous growth of the financial market through
the lens of its core transactional modalities (pooling, layering, acceleration, and
compression) allows us to draw several important conclusions about the nature
of the financial system.
First of all, as a result of these mechanisms' combined operation, the
financial system's macro-dynamics increasingly and increasingly starkly
diverge from the transactional micro-dynamics in the financial market.1 28
Moreover, the macro-level systemic factors play an increasingly important role
in determining what happens in financial markets. In other words, focusing on
transaction-level micro-factors-such as reducing counterparties' transaction
costs, information asymmetries, and various other "frictions"-is less and less
likely to shed any meaningful light on the behavior of the markets in which these
transactions take place. To understand how markets behave, we must look to the
broader modalities of those markets' self-regeneration and growth.
Recognizing how new financial assets and markets are continuously
synthesized via pooling and layering, and then scaled up via acceleration and
compression, helps us to visualize the logic of the system's ever-increasing
structural complexity, internal interconnectedness, and fragility. The financial
marketplace appears not as a flat space in which multiple parallel submarkets
operate as largely independent and potentially competing "financial
intermediation" platforms, but rather as a fractal universe driven by the unifying
matter, portfolio margining typically increases the level of leverage in the account. Id. This, in turn,
enables significant scaling up of trading activity in the relevant market.
126.
See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
127.
From this perspective, it becomes clear that the "innovative" nature of newly
created financial products and market practices should not be confused with, or reduced to, their narrowly
technical or micro-level transactional aspects. I plan to elaborate this important and complex point more
fully as part of a separate research project.
128.
For a theoretical and historical analysis of these general dynamics, see Hockett,
supranote 21.
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logic of self-replication. In this picture of the financial system, the most
significant relational dynamics are not horizontal, as it is implicitly postulated in
the "disintermediation" or "shadow banking" narratives, but vertical, as in the
dynamic patterns of connecting the many layers of financial risk trading.1 29 And
as this system grows bigger and moves faster, it also becomes increasingly
unstable.
Another systemic implication of pooling, layering, acceleration, and
compression is that they naturally operate to decrease the levels of transparency
and governability of the financial market. It is difficult to "see through" the
multiple layers of financial claims in a pyramid-like structure like a multi-layered
fund of funds. It is even more difficult to assess the risks or to predict the
behavior of a highly structured bespoke derivative referencing the value of other
structured products. Similarly, the structural complexity and the speed of
contagion in the financial market often render important market governance
mechanisms, designed to resolve various market frictions, potentially
ineffective. The failure of Lehman Brothers in October of 2008 provides an apt
illustration of these trends.1 30
This example also highlights the third systemic implication of the current
patterns of the growth of financial markets: an increasing importance and
intensity of self-amplifying, or recursive, market-wide collective action
problems and the resulting need for a more direct and effective exercise of
market-wide collective agency.131
A structurally complex system based on the continuous synthesizing of
tradable claims and scaling up trading activity is inherently prone to behaving
procyclically. Investors in the fast-moving, contagion-prone, non-transparent
financial markets are forced to act swiftly and in unison, whether that means not
missing out on a "hot' investment or not being left holding the bag when it turns
"toxic."1

32

While individually rational, this behavior leads to collectively

harmful results, as upward or downward price spirals become entirely divorced

129.
For a full elaboration of this multi-layered architecture of the financial system, see
Hockett & Omarova, supranote 9.
130.
See Michael J. Fleming & Asani Sarkar, The Failure Resolution of Lehman
Brothers,
FED.
RES.
BANK
OF
N.Y.
ECON.
POL'Y
REV.
175
(2014),
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/epr/2014/1412flem.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A6B3-FCLK]. Thus, following the firm's bankruptcy filing, neither Lehman's own
management nor its major trading counterparties were able to establish with certainty the value of its
derivatives positions and resolve the problem through the "normal" governance mechanisms, thus
necessitating government intervention. Id.
131.
For an introduction and definition of the concept of "recursive collective action
problem," or "ReCAP," and for an analysis of how this phenomenon manifests itself in a variety of
contexts, see Robert Hockett, Recursive Collective Action Problems: The Structure ofProcyclicality in
Financialand Monetary Markets, Macroeconomics, and Formally Similar Contexts, 3 J. FIN. PERSP. 1

(2015).
132.
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from so-called fundamental values.' 33 In a market where fundamental value is
often hidden at the bottom of a long chain of increasingly virtualized
representations of that value, these price spirals are bound to be more violent and
destructive, which significantly raises the importance of being able to arrest them
as quickly as possible.
In sum, today's financial market looks nothing like the early stock market
model that inspired classic laissezfaire theories. The market that keeps growing
bigger, faster, more complex, and therefore more vulnerable to sudden and
contagious shocks cannot rely on the "invisible hand" to steer it away from
trouble. That market needs an effective counterweight to collectively disastrous
asset price booms and busts: it needs a collective agent capable of acting not in
pursuit of purely profit-making goals but in the collective interest of all market
participants.' 34 While in theory this type of collective agency may be exercised
by certain large private parties, the sheer scale of the modem financial market
renders the private option impossible in practice. Only public actors, with their
large size and unique risk tolerance, can realistically take on this critically
important market-preserving role.' 35
As discussed above, under the terms of the New Deal settlement in finance,
this market-preserving function has been explicitly assigned to the government,
the quintessential collective agent in a modem polity. The government's role,
however, was deliberately limited in order to leave control over capital allocation
in private hands.' 36 Ironically, the very success of private actors in expanding
their freedom to generate financial risks-via continuous synthesizing of
tradable financial products and via scaling up of secondary market trading-is
now gradually opening the crucial space for a much more direct and proactive
public involvement in managing the flows of capital in financial markets.1 3 7
In this sense, the broad systemic implications of modem financial markets'
modus operandi increasingly push against the basic premises of the New Deal
settlement. In the New Deal paradigm, the government's principal role in
financial markets is that of a regulator, an exogenous force with a clearly limited
mandate to influence private actors' allocative decisions.' 38 Private market
participants, by virtue of their presumed micro-informational advantages and
individualized economic incentives (also presumed to be fundamentally aligned
or align-able with the collective good), retain the ultimate control over allocating
capital to specific economic uses. 3 9 Yet, as the above discussion shows, these

133.
Id.
134.
See id. at 25.
135.
For a full discussion of public instrumentalities' market-preserving functions, see
Hockett & Omarova, Public Actors, supranote 45, at 134-37.
136.
See supra Section I.B.
137.
See Hockett & Omarova, Public Actors, supra note 45, at 140-44, 147-60.
138.
See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
139.
See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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presumptions do not necessarily hold in the context of increasingly complex,
multilayered, self-referentially growing modem financial markets. The
systematic prioritizing of micro-transactional factors over macro-systemic ones,
built into the New Deal settlement, is quickly becoming an impediment to its
continuing efficacy as the overarching market governance framework.' 4 0
The rise of fintech in recent years is likely to elevate these existing tensions
to a qualitatively new level. Viewed in this context, fintech is emerging not
merely as an exciting new way of making financial transactions faster and more
convenient, but as a potentially powerful tool for resetting the current publicprivate balance in the financial system.141 While it is still too early to catalogue
all of the specific ways in which the evolving technologies will or might be used
to this effect, it is nevertheless both possible and necessary to begin a sustained
inquiry into the macro-systemic aspects of key fintech trends.
III. Decoding Fintech: Technological Revolution, Market Evolution, or Power
Devolution?
The arrival of fintech is often equated with a "revolution" in finance. 4 2
Recent advances in digital communications, cryptography, data management,
and machine learning promise to revolutionize financial transactions by making
them infinitely faster, easier, cheaper, more secure, more widely accessible, and
individually tailored to every user's needs. These claims and expectations also
shape much of the public discussion on how fintech is "disrupting" financial
markets and how it should therefore be regulated.
This Article argues that, in order to decode the meaning of "fintech
revolution," we must analyze fintech not as a collection of discrete financerelated micro-transactional technologies, but as a macro-financial, systemic
phenomenon. This requires, in turn, understanding whether, and how, specific
fintech applications are going to affect (or are affecting) the public's capacity to
maintain the stability of the macro-environment. On the one hand, fintech may
present a unique opportunity to correct the structurally destabilizing imbalance
between private generation and public accommodation of financial risk, built
into the existing paradigm of financial regulation. On the other hand, it may

140.
The recent growth of interest among the scholars of financial markets and
regulation in understanding and adapting various insights from complexity studies and systems analysis
reflects a growing recognition of the critical role of macro-systemic factors in finance. See, e.g., Robert
F. Weber, StructuralRegulation as Antidote to Complexity Capture, 49 AM. Bus. L.J. 643 (2012). While
this is a promising avenue of analysis, it is important to keep in mind that, in contrast to many natural
complex systems (such as the human body or a particular ecosystem), the financial system is socially and
legally constructed. It is fundamentally a product of law, which is itself a product of explicit policy
choices. Analyzing the financial market's intra-systemic qualities and functions, therefore, cannot be
separated from the analysis of its normative and political determinants and implications.
141.
See supra Section I.D.
142.
See supra Section I.A.

770

New Tech v. New Deal
further intensify that imbalance, thus raising serious questions about the
continuing viability of the New Deal settlement in finance. In this sense, the story
of fintech is both that of the fundamental continuity and that of a qualitative
change in the broad trajectory of modem finance.
This Part examines some of the more established fintech applicationsincluding cryptocurrencies, distributed ledger technology, marketplace lending,
ICOs, and robo-advising from this perspective.' 4 3 While not making any
definitive claims, it highlights the degree to which these forms of fintech are
poised to facilitate and amplify the preexisting systemic dynamics of finance,
thereby further exacerbating the fundamental tensions built into the New Deal
settlement.
A. EliminatingFrictions:Cryptocurrenciesand DistributedLedgers
To date, arguably the most promising and potentially impactful fintech
applications have focused on resolving specific frictions in payments, clearing,
and settlement of financial claims and transactions the key functions
performed by financial market infrastructures (FMI).1 44 Payments is an area of
particular interest in this respect. This is partly the case because of the sheer
ubiquity and systemic importance of the payment system.1 45 Partly, it is a result
of recognizing persistent problems plaguing cross-border payments that typically
involve several banks (which increases the costs of making payments) and take
several days to clear the hurdles associated with currency conversions and
various other regulatory and administrative issues. 146 Fintech-driven solutions to
the problem of slow and expensive payments range from the invention of
alternative cryptocurrencies that aim to circumvent official sovereign currencybased payment channels to redesigning the payment platforms on the basis of
some new digital technology.
1. Bitcoin: Synthesizing Assets
Bitcoin is the leading example of the first strategy. It is the most established
and prominent cryptocurrency currently in use.147 In simple terms, Bitcoin is a

143.
For a brief introductory description of these technologies, see id.
144.
See Federal Reserve Policy on Payment System Risk, FED. RES. 2 (2017),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/files/psrpolicy.pdf [https://perma.cc/2AWM-525X].
145.
Generally, a payment system is defined as "a set of instruments, procedures and
rules for the transfer of funds between or among participants. Payment systems include, but are not limited
to, large-value funds transfer systems, automated clearinghouse systems, check clearinghouses, and credit
and debit card settlement systems." Id at 6.
146.
Id.
147.
There is a rapidly growing body of popular and academic literature on Bitcoin and
the blockchain technology underlying it. For a small sample, see PRIMAVERA DE FILIPPI & AARON
WRIGHT. BLOCKCHAIN AND THE LAW (2018): NATHANIEL POPPER. DIGITAL GOLD (2015): PAUL VIGNA
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form of digital "cash," a decentralized virtual currency that operates through a
network of peer-to-peer computers, or nodes.' 48 It is an online communication
protocol that enables the use of bitcoins-electronic tokens or bits of data as a
means of payment and exchange similar to regular currencies. 4 9 However, no
sovereign backs Bitcoin, and no state or any single private institution controls its
creation and use.'
At the heart of Bitcoin is an innovative blockchain technology, which
allows verification and recording of each transaction within the system in a
publicly distributed ledger.' Encrypted transactions are solved by the nodes and
grouped in blocks (every few minutes), which are recorded one after another in
a chain. Each node in the system keeps a copy of the whole distributed ledger,
which ensures that the entire record of transactions cannot be altered.' 5 2 Because
of these features, Bitcoin users do not need to place trust in any single institution,
like a bank or a securities broker, to keep the system secure. 5 3 Bitcoins are stored
in digital wallets, or data files that also contain recorded transactions and private
keys necessary to spend or transfer bitcoins.' 54 The true identities of the
transacting parties are hidden behind unique Bitcoin addresses.' Bitcoin can be
used to make payments and transfer value among digital wallet holders within
that virtual system, which makes it a superior method of cross-border
payments.1 56

Bitcoin is "mined" by solving the encrypted transactions that get added to
the blockchain. The software, in effect, creates bitcoins and awards them to
"miners" willing to expend their time and effort to verify encrypted transfers
from one digital wallet to another. Mining Bitcoin requires significant computing
power, and the difficulty of solving transaction "puzzles" is programmed to

& MICHAEL J. CASEY, THE AGE OF CRYPTOCURRENCY (2015); KEVIN WERBACH, THE BLOCKCHAIN AND
THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF TRUST (2018).
148.

See PEDRO FRANCO, UNDERSTANDING BITCOIN: CRYPTOGRAPHY, ENGINEERING,

AND ECONOMICS 4 (2015). Bitcoin was created in 2009 by Satoshi Nakamoto, which is believed to be a
pseudonym for an unknown person or entity. Despite the mysterious nature of Bitcoin's creator(s), its
current proponents maintain that open-sourced software cannot be controlled by its original creator and
truly becomes a collective product that can only be altered by consensus arising in the community of
peers. For a discussion of the intellectual origins and pre-history of Bitcoin, see id. at 161-69; and
WERBACH, supra note 147, at 33-69.
149.
JOSE PAGLIERY, BITCOIN AND THE FUTURE OF MONEY 6 (2014). Bitcoin with a
capital "B" typically refers to the entire system supporting the virtual currency, while "bitcoin" with a
lower-case "b" denotes the actual unit of that currency. Id.
150.
DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 147, at 21; FRANCO, supra note 148, at 3.
151.
For a detailed treatment of blockchain and its operation, see DANIEL DRESCHER,
BLOCKCHAIN BASICS: A NON-TECHNICAL INTRODUCTION IN 25 STEPS (2017).

152.
FRANCO, supra note 148, at 15.
153.
Id. at 8-9; WERBACH, supra note 147, at 96-111.
154.
Rainer Bohme et al., Bitcoin: Economics, Technology, and Governance, 29 J.
ECON. PERSP. 213, 220-21 (2015).
155.
FRANCO, supra note 148, at 9.
156.
DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 147, at 20-22; 63-65.
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increase, in order to keep the supply of Bitcoin from rising too rapidly.'
Importantly, Bitcoin can also be bought and sold for U.S. dollars or any other
sovereign currency. Several Bitcoin exchanges allow conversion of bitcoins into
58
non-virtual currencies.

'

To true Bitcoin enthusiasts, it represents a great vehicle of social good,
which can broaden access to faster and cheaper money transfer and payment
services for the poor and the unbanked around the globe.1 59 Libertarians embrace
Bitcoin as an alternative to state-created conventional currencies and, more
broadly, to the government monopoly on money and credit.' 60 And many techsavvy millennials prefer Bitcoin simply because it combines cost-saving
efficiencies with greater privacy and security.' 6
For the majority of financial market participants, however, Bitcoin's main
virtue is its value as an investment or, more precisely, speculative
investment asset.1 62 As an asset, Bitcoin is extremely volatile. On July 19,
2010, the recorded value of one bitcoin was just $0.06. By December 16, 2017,
the value of a single bitcoin reached $19,343.04.163 According to a respected
industry publication, this puts the rate of Bitcoin's appreciation relative to the
U.S. dollar in those seven years at 32,000,000%. 164 It is, therefore, not surprising
that, while Bitcoin has not been able to displace sovereign currencies, it has
successfully emerged as a brand new financial asset class.1 65
Importantly, Bitcoin's high volatility makes it an attractive underlying
commodity for derivatives trading. 166 In September 2014, TeraExchange

157.
PAGLIERY, supranote 149, at 33-34.
158.
Bohme et al., supranote 154, at 220.
159.
PAGLIERY, supranote 149, at 91-106.
160.
Id. at 129-36. Not surprisingly, the debate on Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies
is frequently framed in terms of their role as an alternative form of money. This Article, however,
intentionally shifts the focus toward cryptocurrencies' presently far more salient role as a new financial
asset class. For an in-depth analysis of the complex dynamics of money-creation, see Hockett & Omarova,
supranote 9.
161.
PAGLIERY, supranote 149, at 115-20.
162.
See Rosa M. Lastra & Jason Allen, Virtual Currencies in the Eurosystem:
Challenges
Ahead,
ECON
MONETARY
DIALOGUE
STUDY
24
(July
2018),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/150541/DIWFINAL%20publication.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E3QB-HYUD].
163.
See Daniel Hinge, The Huntfor a Crypto Taxonomy, CENTRAL BANKING (May 4,
2018), https://www.centralbanking.com/central-banks/currency/digital-currencies/3494476/the-hunt-fora-crypto-taxonomy [https://perma.cc/TY2F-WDTK] (citing CoinDesk data).
164.
Id.
165.
For a more detailed analysis of these dynamics, see Hockett & Omarova, supra
note 9, at 1208-11. Of course, this does not deny the possibility of Bitcoin, or some other cryptocurrency,
gaining broader circulation in commercial transactions in the future. See infra notes 171-172 and
accompanying text.
166.
The sheer magnitude of the Bitcoin speculative hype, especially in 2016-17, is
staggering. Although in the first half of 2018 Bitcoin's market value came down significantly from its
peak of nearly $20,000 in late 2017, it was still hovering around $10,000 in May 2018. In his
characteristically unsparing manner, Warren Buffett referred to Bitcoin as "rat poison squared," a less
esthetically pleasing image than that of a tulip bulb. See Tae Kim, Warren Buffett Says Bitcoin is
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established the first regulator-approved U.S. bitcoin derivatives trading
platform.1 67 In December 2017, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) and
the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE), the two largest and oldest U.S.
commodity futures exchanges, raced to launch Bitcoin futures contracts.1 68 As
the CME's website proclaimed, "Now you can hedge Bitcoin exposure or
harness its performance with a futures product developed by the leading and
largest derivatives marketplace: CME Group, where the world comes to manage
risk."1 69 In May 2018, Goldman Sachs announced a decision to establish its own
Bitcoin derivatives trading desk, in response to its institutional clients' growing
interest in holding Bitcoin "as an alternate store of value" and to create "its own,
more flexible version of a future, known as a non-deliverable forward."1 7 0 Later
that same year, Intercontinental Exchange (ICE), a company that owns and
operates New York Stock Exchange and various other exchanges and clearing
houses, announced its plan to launch Bakkt, a new integrated platform for trading
crypto-assets, starting with a physically delivered daily Bitcoin futures
contract.' 7 ' A powerful financial market infrastructure conglomerate, ICE is
undoubtedly well-situated to make Bakkt the first global "one-stop-shop" for
trading, storing, and even spending digital assets for commercial purposes.1 72
"Probably Rat Poison Squared," CNBC (May 5, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/05/warrenbuffett-says-bitcoin-is-probably-rat-poison-squared.html [https://perma.cc/2BQN-EPCS].
167.
See Michael J. Casey, TeraExchange Unveils First U.S.-RegulatedBitcoin Swaps
Exchange, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 12, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/teraexchange-launches-bitcoinderivatives-exchange-1410543989 [https://perma.cc/CA7J-XUGU].
168.
See Dan DeFrancesco, FCMs Demand Self-Certification Overhaul After Bitcoin
Debacle, RISK (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.risk.net/commodities/5394306/fcms-demand-selfcertification-overhaul-after-bitcoin-debacle [https://perma.cc/MCN5-NLKK]. Both CME and CBOE
listed their respective Bitcoin contracts through self-certification, which allowed them to avoid submitting
the proposed contracts for regulatory approval. They were later criticized for the rushed and nontransparent nature of their actions, given the riskiness of these completely new products. Id.
169.
CME
GROUP,
http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/bitcoin-futures.html
[https://perma.cc/D3RT-TSAC].
170.
Nathaniel Popper, Goldman Sachs to Open a Bitcoin Trading Operation, N.Y.
TIMES (May 2, 2018), https:/mobile.nytimes.com/2018/05/02/technology/bitcoin-goldman-sachs.html
[https://perma.cc/QZ9H-FRM9]; Wolfie Zhao, Goldman Sachs to Begin Bitcoin Futures Trading,
COINDESK (May 3, 2018), https://www.coindesk.com/goldman-sachs-to-begin-bitcoin-futures-tradingwithin-weeks [https://perma.cc/BHY5-C5FG].
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See About Bakkt, BAKKT, https://www.bakkt.com/index [https://perma.cc/8LD5ASC5]. Notably, ICE's partners in the Bakkt venture include both Microsoft and Starbucks, whose
customer base is the natural captive market for potentially massive commercial adoption of Bitcoin or any
other cryptocurrency that Bakkt includes in its product offerings. See Sarah Whitten & Kate Rooney, New
Starbucks Partnershipwith Microsoft Allows Customers to Pay for Frappuccinos with Bitcoin, CNBC

(Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/03/starbucks-partners-with-microsoft-ice-on-newcryptocurrency.html [https://perma.cc/8R2S-VREL]. It is somewhat ironic, of course, that technolibertarians' grand vision of Bitcoin as "democratic" money may finally come closer to becoming reality
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Turning Bitcoin into the raw material for derivatives trading has critically
important systemic consequences. It legitimizes Bitcoin as a bonafide tradable
financial asset, rather than merely a virtual token without any tangible value
backing it, and incorporates it into the established financial market infrastructure.
This instantly transforms the dynamics of Bitcoin trading by scaling up its
volume and helping to support its price. In short, it makes Bitcoin a digital
token, or a bit of encrypted data part of the same menu of financial assets as
U.S. Treasury Bonds and shares in General Electric.1 73
Bitcoin's amazing journey from an obscure techno-utopian experiment to
Goldman Sachs' market-making books and institutional investors' portfolios is
also fascinating in a deeper sense. It provides a vivid example of how fintech
technology can be, and is, used to synthesize tradable financial assets effectively
out of thin air. In contrast to even the most esoteric traditional (that is, prefintech) financial products, the volume of tradable Bitcoin is not tied to, and thus
constrained by, any financial claims issued in the primary markets for capital.
The volume or value of Bitcoin bears no relation to the production of any actual
goods or services in the nonfinancial economy. The supply of Bitcoin grows
simply as a result of trading and transacting in Bitcoin. It is, in this sense, an
entirely self-referential and self-reproducing secondary-market phenomenon.1 74
The growth of Bitcoin derivatives and potentially other Bitcoin-linked
products (such as exchange-traded funds passively tracking bitcoin's value) is a
classic example of pooling and layering, two of the core transactional techniques
used to synthesize new tradable claims referencing a single underlying asset. The
fact that, in this case, the underlying asset is a digital token, as opposed to shares
in operating companies or barrels of oil, potentially removes any "natural" limits
on the extent of such pooling and layering and, accordingly, on the ability of
market participants to scale up trading in these continuously synthesized cryptoassets.

2. Distributed Ledger Technology: Scaling Up Trading
In recent years, numerous financial institutions and fintech firms have been
actively exploring a broader range of potential applications of the blockchain-

through the deliberate exploitation of urban dwellers' caffeine addiction by a small club of marketdominating corporations. If that were to happen, it would give the "Starbucks finance" metaphor a very
different meaning. See supranote 106.
173.
For a predictive analysis of this trend, see Hockett & Omarova, supranote 9.
174.
This, of course, runs directly contrary to the basic principles underlying modern
monetary policy, where central banks continuously manage the money supply relative to the broader
economy's productive capacity.
175.
Although this discussion focused specifically on Bitcoin, it is important to
remember that Bitcoin is merely the most advanced-stage representative of the vast and rapidly expanding
universe of crypto-assets.
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or, more broadly, "distributed ledger"-technology underlying Bitcoin.1 76
Generally, distributed ledger technology (DLT) may be defined as "a set of
technological solutions that enables a single, sequenced, standardized and
cryptographically-secured record of activity to be safely distributed to, and acted
upon by, a network of varied participants." 7 7 It is important to note that DLT is
not new or unique in its ability to allow multiple network participants to share
and view data in near real time; it is simply another model within the familiar
category of a "distributed database management system." 78 Yet, the blockchain
mystique factor the marketing power of the new fintech lexicon has
catapulted DLT into the very center of the financial sector's digital "innovation"
efforts.1 79

Because DLT is said to be "asset-agnostic," in a sense of being able to
provide "the storage, recordkeeping, and transfer of any asset," it can potentially
be applied to optimizing a variety of processes, including not only payments but
also post-trade clearing and settlement of any asset.' So-called "smart
contracts" that reside on distributed ledgers and distill contractual terms into a
self-executing computer code can also be used for ongoing management of
collateral and other counterparty obligations.'
Given the magnitude, the complexity of institutional arrangements, and the
systemic significance of the payments, clearing, and settlement functions in
wholesale financial markets, practical implementation of these concepts is no
easy task. Not surprisingly, there are currently several parallel efforts to
revolutionize these systems through adoption of DLT or "smart contracts."182
These include, for example, the IBM-backed HyperLedger Fabric project that
seeks to optimize cross-border trade financing and an open-source Corda

176.
Technically, blockchain is merely a particular kind of DLT. For purposes of the
present discussion, however, these differences are not especially relevant, and these terms will therefore
be used interchangeably. See generally sources cited supranote 147.
177.

FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY (UK), DISCUSSION PAPER ON DISTRIBUTED

LEDGER TECHNOLOGY, DP17/3, 10 (Apr. 2017), https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/discussion/dpl703.pdf [https://perma.cc/27L6-HHFZ].
178.
Id.
179.
Id.
180.
David Mills et al., Distributed Ledger Technology in Payments, Clearing, and
Settlement 17 (Fed.
Res. Bd., Fin. & Econ.
Disc. Paper No. 2016-095,
2016),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/feds/2016/files/2016095pap.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NUM5NHU3].
181.
See Luke Clancy & Steve Marlin, Banks Test Promise of Blockchain as CCP
Replacement, RISK (Dec. 22, 2015), https://www.risk.net/risk-management/2439561/banks-test-promiseblockchain-ccp-replacement [https://perma.cc/E24Y-V8XL]; see also, DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note
147, at 89-104 (discussing "smart" securities and derivatives).
182.
For a reminder of what "smart contracts" are, see supranote 30 and accompanying
text.
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platform for managing bank-to-bank financial agreements being developed by a
large bank consortium, R3. 83
In 2017, another consortium of major global banks, led by Switzerland's
UBS, announced the next phase in the development of so-called "utility
settlement coin," or USC.1 8 4 The USC is a digital currency stored on a

permissioned blockchain and used by member banks to make payments to one
another to clear and settle securities trades. This new cryptocurrency
arrangement will allow for much faster and convenient clearing and settlement
of bond and equity trades between the participating banks.' In each trade, both
the bought-and-sold securities and the payment for them will be "delivered"
through the consortium's blockchain system. Instead of using the relevant
jurisdiction's official payment system and waiting for traditional money
transfers to be completed, these banks will simply transfer the relevant amounts
in USC to one another's USC accounts. The payee banks will then exchange
their USC holdings for the relevant sovereign currency, on a one-to-one basis.' 86
This key feature of the proposed closed-universe, blockchain-based interbank
payment platform USC's direct convertibility into major sovereign
currencies requires an explicit commitment on the part of the relevant central
banks to support the arrangement. 7 The consortium reportedly approached
several central banks presumably, the Federal Reserve, European Central
Bank, Bank of England, and Bank of Japan to set up a system for guaranteed
exchanges of USC for all major sovereign currencies.'
In early 2019, JPMorgan Chase & Co., the $2.6 trillion financial
conglomerate, 8 9 successfully tested its private blockchain-based digital coin,
called JPM Coin.1 90 Pegged to the value of the U.S. dollar, JPM Coin is designed

183.
See Hugh Harsono, Bank-Based Blockchain Projects Are Going to Transform the
FinancialServices Industry, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 28. 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/01/28/bankbased-blockchain-projects-are-going-to-transform-the-financial-services-industry
[https://perma.cc/XQY9-B5F6]; Tanaya Macheel, R3 Makes Code for FinancialAgreements Platform
Open Source, AM. BANKER (Nov. 30,2016), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/r3-makes-code-forfinancial-agreements-platform-open-source [https://perma.cc/2JTF-7555].
184.
Michael del Castillo, Barclays, HSBC Join Settlement Coin as Bank Blockchain
Test Enters New Phase, COINDESK (Aug. 30, 2017), https://www.coindesk.com/hsbc-barclays-joinutility-settlement-coin-as-bank-blockchain-test-enters-final-phase [https://perma.cc/BLF2-SF5V].
185.
Id.
186.
See Izabella Kaminska, What Is 'Utility Settlement Coin' Really?, FIN. TIMES:
ALPHAVILLE (Sept. 18, 2017), https:/ftalphaville.ft.com/2017/09/18/2193542/what-is-utility-settlementcoin-really [https://perma.cc/PL3W-G9MK].
187.
Id.
188.
Id.
189.
JPMorgan
Chase
&
Co., Annual
Report (Form
10-K),
at
1,
https://jpmorganchaseco.gcs-web.com/static-files/cdb056f9-4973-4dc9-9319-e418b9ccf28f
[https://perma.cc/MK3K-S9EJ] (reporting that JPMorgan Chase held $2.6 trillion in assets as of
December 31, 2018).
190.
See JP. Morgan Creates Digital Coin for Payments, JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.
(Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.jpmorgan.com/global/news/digital-coin-payments [https://perma.cc/V998HXDF]. JPM Coin is run on JPMorgan's permissioned Quorum Blockchain, an enterprise version of
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to facilitate instantaneous payments and settlement of securities transactions
among JPMorgan's institutional clients.' 9' The launch of the JPM Coin pilot
elicited a great deal of excitement and support from the crypto-trading
community, which viewed it as a significant milestone in the evolution of DLT
and a sure sign of the "arrival of the institutional herd."1 92 JPMorgan's status as
the country's largest diversified banking conglomerate with its famed "fortress
balance sheet" and direct access to public backing-is what gives DLT "a
credibility boost in the eyes of industry peers, regulators and even consumers. "193
Even more to the point, the fact that JPMorgan Chase, N.A., the group's flagship
banking entity, is a major global clearing and custody bank effectively
guarantees high demand for JPM Coin among financial market participants.1 94 A
massive roll-out of JPM Coin, in turn, is guaranteed to elevate JPMorgan, already
a poster child for the controversial "too big to fail" phenomenon, to a
qualitatively new level of systemic importance in the world's financial market
infrastructure.195
The shortage of detailed information on big banks' private tokenization
projects currently under way makes it difficult to understand how exactly these
new DLT-based payments, clearing, and settlement arrangements will work in
practice.1 96 It is even more difficult to identify and assess their potential impact-

Ethereum, with the future goal of making it operable across all Ethereum-based blockchain platforms. Id.
For more on Ethereum, see infra notes 227-228 and accompanying text.
191.
Id. In effect, JPMorgan is simply "tokenizing" its institutional clients' U.S. dollardenominated deposit balances. Importantly, the bank plans to extend its digital coin operations both to
retail customer deposits and to deposits denominated in other sovereign currencies. Id.
192.
Andrew Keys, JP. Morgan Is Using Ethereum to Launch a Digital U.S.
Dollar' Here's
What
It
Means for
Blockchain,
CONSENSYS
(Feb.
14,
2019),
https:/media.consensys.net/j-p-morgan-is-using-ethereum-to-launch-a-digital-u-s-dollar-heres-what-itmeans-for-blockchain-64f~fe3e55bc [https://perma.cc/QMZ8-F4DT].
193.
Suleman Din & Will Hernandez, List: 5 Things JPM Coin Will Do for Banking
andBlockchain, AM. BANKER (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.americanbanker.com/list/5-things-jpm-coinwill-do-for-banking-and-blockchain [https://perma.cc/ZSU4-49ZR].
194.
See Penny Crosman, Can JPMorgan Chase's JPM Coin Knock Off Ripple and
Swift?, AM. BANKER (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/can-jpmorgan-chases-jpmcoin-knock-off-ripple-and-swift [https://perma.cc/HYF8-D99H] (stating that the 157 banks currently
using JPMorgan Chase's payments network are expected to use JPM Coin for domestic and cross-border
payments, while other banks may feel compelled to use it); Eleni Digalaki, JPMorgan Is Launching the
First
US
Bank-Backed
Digital
Token,
BUS.
INSIDER
(Feb.
19,
2019),
https://www.businessinsider.com/jpmorgan-launching-jpm-coin-cryptocurrency-2019-2
[https://perma.cc/TN48-C7ST] ("The banking giant moves over $6 trillion globally per day for
companies, while its wholesale clients include 80% of all Fortune 500 corporations, giving JPM Coin a
solid chance to see widespread adoption.").
195.
For an in-depth analysis of the "too big to fail" phenomenon in finance, see Saule
T. Omarova, The 'Too Big To Fail"Problem, 103 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019).
196.
The design and operation of USC and JPM Coin are especially intriguing in this
respect. See id. On the most basic level, both USC and JPM Coin are what is now known as "stablecoins":
cryptoassets whose value is typically pegged to some sovereign currency, like the U.S. dollar. Stablecoins
are designed to hold their value vis-a-vis sovereign money and, as a result, to serve as "safe" cryptoassets
(effectively collateralized by sovereign money). See Matthew Leising, Love Crypto, ButNotIts Volatility?
Meet Stablecoins, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 27, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-
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both positive and negative-on the financial system's operation, resilience, and
stability.
Generally, the most frequently cited potential benefits of using DLT for
payments, clearing, and settlement include its ability to reduce complexity in
cross-border transactions, improve "end-to-end processing speed and thus
availability of assets and funds," increase "transparency and immutability in
transaction record keeping," improve "network resilience through distributed
data management," and reduce "operational and financial risks."1 97 In essence,
DLT is expected to make trades settle pretty much instantaneously, thus
significantly reducing transactional costs and counterparty risk. Some of the
most widely cited potential risks of moving payments, clearing, and settlement
functions onto DLT platforms include increased cyber-security and operational
vulnerabilities, legal uncertainty with respect to ownership of digital tokens or
enforceability of smart contracts, and (very importantly) finality of settlement in
a distributed system not backed by a central bank.1 98 For most of these
enumerated problems, though, there appear to be reasonably manageable
solutions, some of which involve things like "more nimble" regulatory
responses.1 99
From a systemic point of view, however, the prospect of widespread
adoption of DLT-based systems for payments, clearing, and settlement of
financial transactions may not be quite so favorably balanced. The main concern
here is straightforward. If DLT succeeds in making wholesale payments,
clearing, and settlement instantaneous, easy, and cheap, it will enable potentially
exponential growth in the volume and velocity of trading in securities and other

27/love-crypto-but-not-its-volatility-meet-stablecoins-quicktake [https://perma.cc/K7AZ-WRA8]. Tether
is one of the earliest and best-known stablecoins, but the list of these instruments is rapidly growing. See,
e.g., THE STABLECOIN INDEX, https:/stablecoinindex.com [https://perma.cc/T2G6-6NJA]. Despite the
recent explosion in stablecoins' popularity, however, it is not clear to what extent they are actually "safe"
and able to maintain their peg to central bank money. See Penny Crosman, N. Y RegulatorsHave Approved
Two

Cryptocurrencies.

Now

What?,

AM.

BANKER

(Sept.

11,

2018),

https://www.americanbanker.com/news/ny-regulators-have-approved-two-cryptocurrencies-now-what
[https://perma.cc/SC3E-HUV2]; Nikhilesh De, Stablecoins All Want to Be $1, But They're Not Worth the
Same, COINDESK (Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.coindesk.com/which-stablecoin-is-the-riskiest-thecrypto-market-is-pricing-that-in [https://perma.cc/E3MY-3TRV]. However, two closely related factors
set JPM Coin and USC apart from most other stablecoins: (1) the fact that they are issued by publicly
backed and regulated banks, which serves as an important guarantee of their stable value; and (2) their
potential to reach (individually or collectively) the dominant position in cross-border wholesale securities
clearing and settlement. See Ian Allison, R3 Rebuffed in Attempted Bidfor Settlement Coin Blockchain
Project, COINDESK (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.coindesk.com/r3-rejected-utility-settlement-coinblockchain [https://perma.cc/T4WA-ZW63].
197.
See Mills et al., supra note 180, at 17; COMM. ON PAYMENTS & MKT.
INFRASTRUCTURES, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY IN PAYMENT,

CLEARING
AND
SETTLEMENT
1
(Feb.
2017),
https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/dl57.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K6H9-X4GP].
198.
See Mills et al., supranote 180, at 28-29, 31-34.
199.
"Regulatory sandboxes," which effectively exempt qualifying fintech firms from
otherwise applicable regulations, are often presented as this kind of a nimble response. See generally
Allen, supra note 7.
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financial assets. To put it simply, in a fully frictionless world of blockchainpowered transaction processing, overtly speculative trading will also be faster,
easier, cheaper, and thus more voluminous.
Such system-wide scaling up of trading activity goes far beyond a mere
improvement in end-to-end processing speed. Quantitative changes of this
magnitude are bound to effect a qualitative change in the nature and behavior of
financial markets more generally. This qualitative shift in market structure and
dynamics will, in turn, magnify the systemic role of and amplify the pressure on
central banks and other public instrumentalities charged with ensuring financial
stability. Hyper-fast, hyper-expansive financial markets will require a hyper-fast
and hyper-capacious public actor of "last resort." 200 Envisioning the specific
form or forms this collective agency should take is an exercise in bold
institutional imagination, bound to raise a host of politically salient questions.20
Unless we are ready to face these questions, we are not ready for the arrival of
frictionless trading in financial assets.
One more point is worth making in connection with DLT and its potential
to revolutionize payments, clearing, and settlement infrastructure. Recall that the
original Bitcoin payment system is designed to operate on the real-time gross
settlement (RTGS) basis: each bitcoin transfer between wallets is assigned a
unique identifier and, once added to the immutable public ledger, serves as an
objective proof of the coin's ownership. In this "trustless" world, there is no
built-in transactional credit function. No specialized intermediaries are lending
their own balance sheets to transacting parties, and, therefore, there is no native
netting capability.
This pure RTGS principle at the heart of the Bitcoin system or, in terms
of the market dynamics discussed above, accelerationwithout compression-is
the main reason why public blockchain in its original form cannot support largescale trading in financial markets. Without the ability to net, counterparties'
liquidity needs impose hard constraints on the volume of trading they can sustain.
Furthermore, not only does the system have to process a great many more
individual transactions, it also does not allow for trading on credit. Nor does it
allow for using coins as collateral: a verified transfer effects a simple change in
ownership recorded in the distributed ledger. Operationally, leverage becomes

200.
For examples of what such a high-capacity public instrumentality might look like,
see Hockett & Omarova, Public Actors, supra note 45, at 140-74; Hockett & Omarova, supra note 44;
Omarova, supra note 61.
201.
Among other things, it will directly implicate the recently reignited controversy
over central bank powers and independence. For recent contributions to this debate, see PETER CONTIBROWN, THE POWERAND INDEPENDENCE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE (2016); PAUL TUCKER, UNELECTED
POWER (2018).

780

New Tech v. New Deal
far more difficult to use in a system that explicitly precludes "double-spending,"
or spending what you don't fully and exclusively own.202
It is this fundamental problem that the financial industry actors the
supposedly "disintermediated" banks and the "disruptive" nonbank challengers
alike are seeking to solve. Characteristically, both the problem and the
solutions are couched in purely technological terms as a matter primarily of
processing speed or computing power. Among the reported solutions is the
Lightning Network,203 which allows people to sign smart contracts creating
"time-locked, two-way payment channels" based on a pre-agreed notional
amount and seeded with a single bitcoin payment. 204 The parties can then transfer
money to one another within that pre-set balance, as well as to and from third
parties' accounts, forming "a network of traced payments that need not be
confirmed in the Bitcoin blockchain." 205 By allowing limitless "off-chain"
transactions managed via smart contracts, Lightning promises to overcome
Bitcoin's processing capacity limits and to allow it to compete with Visa's
network. 206
These efforts, however, aim to deliver far more than simply a technical fix
for a technical problem. Lightning and similar programs are potentially creating
a crucial system-wide capacity for levering and netting of financial transactions
"off chain." Now, what gets recorded in the publicly distributed ledger can
simply be a net result of multiple trades run by dealers: a single ultimate number
that provides precious little insight into market activity underlying it. In effect,
this off-chain transacting replicates the familiar patterns of margin trading and
collateralized borrowing that enable financial asset speculation. The new
technology does not alter the economic substance, and public policy
implications, of these transactional techniques: it is still all about private parties
borrowing to make short-term profits in secondary market trading. But
technology makes these old dynamics much less visible behind the shining veil
of scientific progress. What used to be done "off balance sheet" can now be done
"off blockchain," and with the same result: potentially excessive financial risk
and leverage hidden behind an ostensibly transparent ledger. Yet, focusing on
the form in which that publicly viewable but informationally incomplete ledger

202.
To be clear, the absence of native netting and credit-extension capabilities presents
a significant problem in the case of a non-permissioned, or truly distributed, ledger. Permissioned
blockchain networks, such as JPMorgan's Quorum or the USC consortium's ledger, can be (and almost
surely are) designed with embedded netting and credit-extension functionalities. See supranotes 184-195
and accompanying text.
203.
See LIGHTNING NETWORK, https:/lightning.network [https://perma.cc/AR4B69W4].
204.
MICHAEL J. CASEY & PAUL VIGNA, THE TRUTH MACHINE: THE BLOCKCHAINAND
THE FUTURE OF EVERYTHING 75 (2018).

205.
206.

Id.
Id.
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exists, whether it is a physical book or a complex piece of software, distracts
attention from this basic fact.
B. DemocratizingFinance:DigitalCrowdfunding and Robo-Advising
In addition to its ability to optimize transaction processing and eliminate
frictions in the operation of financial market infrastructures, fintech is often
praised for its unprecedented potential to make financial markets more inclusive
and equally accessible.20 7 Bitcoin, for example, is often touted as a tool of
financial inclusion, because it makes payments and asset transfers more
affordable. Two other fintech trends explicitly credited with this
"democratizing" effect on financial markets are digital crowdfunding (including
marketplace lending and ICOs) and robo-advising.
1. Marketplace Lending and ICOs: Synthesizing Assets
Crowdfunding is a loose category covering historically varied forms of
finance.2 08 Today, crowdfunding generally refers to raising funds from a large
number of individual investors, typically by using online social networks or
specialized funding platforms.20 9 These platforms allow start-up companies and
individual entrepreneurs to "market" their idea to a wide range of potential
210
investors and, if successful, raise capital at a lower cost.

207.
See supra Section I.A. For a recent formulation of this approach to fintech as a
potentially transformative force in promoting financial inclusion, see ALL. FOR FIN. INCLUSION, FINTECH
FOR FINANCIAL INCLUSION: A FRAMEWORK FOR DIGITAL FINANCIAL TRANSFORMATION (Sept. 2018),

https://www.afi-global.org/sites/default/files/publications/201809/AFIFinTechSpecial%20Report AW digital.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ESS-D2UX].
208.
Crowdfunding is a form of crowdsourcing, a term that encompasses a broader
variety of mass collaborations on a particular project or idea. Crowdsourcing often involves sharing of
innovative ideas and soliciting of technical support, feedback, or other resources from the "crowd."
Although not officially known as "crowdsourcing," the practice of gathering monetary or in-kind
contributions from a dispersed group of people was widely used throughout history, most notably for
various charitable purposes. See Craig R. Everett, Origins and Development of Credit-Based
Crowdfunding (Working Paper, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2442897
[https://perma.cc/B2NZ-RJ44]. The advent of the internet enabled the rapid development of numerous
peer-to-peer online transactional platforms (e.g., eBay and Napster) that led to the emergence of the
current forms of online crowdfunding. See COGNIZANT, MARKETPLACE LENDING: A MATURING MARKET
MEANS

NEW

PARTNER

MODELS,

BUSINESS

OPPORTUNITIES

2

(July

2014),

http://www.cognizant.com/InsightsWhitepapers/Marketplace-Lending-A-Maturing-Market-MeansNew-Partner-Models-Business-Opportunities-codex989.pdf [https://perma.cc/6C3P-MN3W]. In this
Article, I use the term crowdfunding to refer solely to financial investment-oriented transactions, rather
than philanthropically motivated loans or donations.
209.
Joan MacLeod Heminway & Shelden Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril:
Crowdfunding andthe Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REV. 879, 881 (2011).
210.
For examples of online crowdfunding sites that provide a virtual marketplace for
prospective
equity
investors
and
capital-seeking
entrepreneurs,
see
EQUITYNET,
https://www.equitynet.com/how-it-works.aspx
[https://perma.cc/D74D-KJ36];
FUNDABLE,
https://www.fundable.com/landing/crowdfunding [https://perma.cc/JN3N-48V9].
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Marketplace (a.k.a. peer-to-peer, or P2P) lending is simply crowdfunding
of debt. It seeks to lower the costs of unsecured borrowing by eliminating the
need for the services of a commercial bank or any other institutional lender. In
the United States, online P2P lending got its official start in late 2005, when
Prosper.com launched its online platform.? Prosper.com and LendingClub,
both of which focused initially on consolidation of consumer debt, quickly
became the leading U.S. marketplace lending platforms. Their success spurred
rapid growth of online lending platforms specializing in various loan products.2 12
Although individual lending platforms' operational models may differ, they
generally share certain basic features. They typically cap the size and maturity
of individual loans, limit individual investors' exposure to a particular borrower
by breaking up the loan amount among a large number of investors, and use
internal and external credit ratings to determine the risk-adjusted interest rate on
each loan. The lending platform operators collect transaction and servicing
fees. 213 The basic idea is that, by using advanced technology to process
information and underwrite loans quickly and at a low cost, marketplace lending
sites are able to match individual lenders and borrowers efficiently and
transparently.214
The proliferation of marketplace financing sites in the last decade led some
observers to declare "possibly the beginning of a revolution in how the general
public allocates capital."215 Others welcomed it as a rising tide of ultimate
"disintermediation." 216 However, the business quickly attracted sophisticated
financial players able to conduct credit analysis and run risk models to tailor
higher returns from their marketplace loan investments. Hedge funds, private
equity funds, banks, insurance companies, and wealthy individuals became the
primary buyers of marketplace loan products,2 17 which generally have higher

211.
See
PROSPER
MARKETPLACE,
INC.,
https://www.prosper.com
[https://perma.cc/V2C5-MLNE]. The model was pioneered in the United Kingdom by Zopa, which
launched the first peer-to-peer lending platform in 2005.
212.

RICHARDS KIBBE & ORBE LLP, 2015 SURVEY OF U.S. MARKETPLACE LENDING

(2015),
https://www.rkollp.com/assets/htmldocuments/RKOLenderSurvey FINAL2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NUP2-ZXZ3].
213.
See Renaud Laplanche, Five Big Myths About Marketplace Lending, AM. BANKER
(Jan. 28, 2015), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/five-big-myths-about-marketplace-lending
[https://perma.cc/9G3P-2MAZ].
214.
Unlike banks, P2P platforms typically do not make loans using their own balance
sheets: they simply find individuals willing to lend money to a particular borrower at a particular rate. In
this model, even high-risk borrowers should be able to find potential lenders willing to take a small portion
of the risk, if compensated accordingly. Banks and other balance-sheet lenders don't have such flexibility.
215.
C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding andthe FederalSecuritiesLaws, 2012 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 1, 5 (2012).
216.
Andrew Verstein, The MisregulationofPerson-to-PersonLending, 45 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 445, 449 (2011).
217.
See Kevin Wack et al., Innovation of the Year: Online MarketplaceLending, AM.
BANKER (Dec. 17, 2014), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/innovation-of-the-year-onlinemarketplace-lending [https://perma.cc/YDA6-YQ22]. Thus, investment management giant BlackRock
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interest rates than traditional bank loans.2 18 Many of these investments are
leveraged and subsequently securitized.2 9
The entry of yield-hungry institutional investors led to increased
competition in the sector and pushed marketplace lenders to grow their loan
origination volumes, diversify their loan products, and consolidate.220
Marketplace lenders now routinely form partnerships with banks and other
institutional investors, pursuant to which banks and other investors commit to
buying a certain percentage of whole loans originated by or through the
marketplace platform.22 ' To satisfy institutional investors' demand for this
lucrative asset class, marketplace lenders intensified their borrower-acquisition
efforts, partly by extending more high-risk loans.222
In short, within a decade, marketplace lending has effectively evolved from
an alternative form of peer-to-peer finance into a post-crisis rendition of
subprime lending and shadow-banking securitization.2 2 3 In this sense, it
functions as a classic channel of continuous synthesizing of tradable assets used
to construct multi-layered and interconnected chains of financial claims. Rather
than reinventing credit as a truly decentralized and democratic means of mutual
self-help, today's marketplace lending operates primarily as a means of scaling
up trading volumes in institutionally dominated wholesale markets.2 24
By 2017, the tech-savvy public's attention had shifted to a new form of
digital crowdfunding: "initial coin offerings," or ICOs. In an ICO, a firm

heavily invested in marketplace lending, while George Soros and former PIMCO CEO Mohamed El-Erian
were among the high-profile individual investors. Id.
218.
For example, LendingClub has delivered an adjusted annualized return of nearly
8.7% on the first $8 billion of issued loans and has issued over $1 billion in personal loans carrying interest
rates above 20%. Todd Baker, MarketplaceLenders Are a Systemic Risk, AM. BANKER (Aug. 17, 2015),
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/marketplace-lenders-are-a-systemic-risk
[https://perma.cc/RGV8-4RDM]. In 2014, OnDeck, a marketplace platform specializing in small business
lending, reportedly issued loans at an average annual percentage rate of 54%. Kenneth A. Posner,
Alternative Lenders Have a Ways to Go to Ensure "Revolution," AM. BANKER (Jan. 12, 2015),
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/alternative-lenders-have-a-ways-to-go-to-ensure-revolution
[https://perma.cc/SZ64-NAVB].
219.
See Kevin Wack et al., supranote 217.
220.
See Kevin Wack, Shakeout Is Coming, Marketplace Lenders Warn, AM. BANKER
(Apr. 16, 2015).
221.
See Kevin Wack et al., supranote 217; Mike Cagney, How Marketplace Lenders
Will
Save
Financial
Services,
AM.
BANKER
(Aug.
19,
2015),
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/how-marketplace-lenders-will-save-financial-services
[https://perma.cc/XSW9-3YP7].
222.
See Baker, supra note 218.
223.
See Hockett & Omarova, supranote 9, at 1207.
224.
In June 2018, SoFi's CEO announced the company's new strategy of making loan
decisions, funds disbursements, and securitizations instant. Penny Crosman, SoFi's CEO Strategy for
Success:
"Make
Every
Transaction
Faster," AM.
BANKER
(June
20,
2018),
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/sofi-ceos-strategy-for-success-make-every-transaction-faster
[https://perma.cc/XPW4-WZFX]. This aptly underscores the significant potential of marketplace lending
as a broad-based platform for the continuous synthesizing of high-yield assets and scaling up of secondary
market trading.
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planning to develop and produce some form of a digital product (e.g., new
software) sells project-specific digital tokens that can be used as units of
currency in purchaser's hands once the project launches.225 Depending on the
scheme, these tokens may be used for different purposes: some of them simply
allow access to an online platform or grant participation and governance rights
in a particular online network, others can be used to buy the product or service
being funded, and yet others may entitle their holders to an actual portion of
profits from the project in question.226 The vast majority of ICOs to date are done
using smart contracts on the Ethereum platform.22 7 The key advantage of using
Ethereum is that its technology allows for smooth post-ICO trading of the tokens:
i.e., it enables the emergence of a secondary market in these new digital
assets. "228
In 2014, Ethereum itself became one of the first examples of a successful
ICO by raising about $18.4 million through pre-sales of ether, its native cryptocurrency. 229 As the popularity and use of Ethereum as the platform of choice for
various crypto-projects grew, the value of ether increased correspondingly,
making it a valuable financial investment.230 ICOs went mainstream in 2017,
which saw hundreds of offerings raise billions of dollars. 23' Notably, the most
successful ICOs of the year included ventures promising to improve the existing
blockchain infrastructure, to offer a "better" cryptocurrency, or to make existing
crypto-assets easier to monetize.232

OVERVIEW

225.

See supra note 33 and accompanying text.

226.

See WILSON

OF

SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, INITIAL COIN OFFERINGS: AN

REGULATORY

CONSIDERATIONS

(June

30,

2017),

https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/initial-coin-offerings-an-overview-of-98251
[https://perma.cc/236X-LZN7].
227.
See CASEY & VIGNA, supra note 204, at 99. Ethereum is designed as a common
platform for hosting an infinite variety of so-called "decentralized apps" (or "Dapps") for
cryptographically recording and exchanging all manner of digitized data: medical records, land titles, titles
to goods, marriage certificates, copyright and other rights, contractual payments, etc. Computers verifying
transactions earn ether, Ethereum's cryptocurrency, whose value accordingly increases as the network
grows. Ethereum's internal programming language allows third parties to write an unlimited variety of
programs, thus enabling an unlimited variety of "smart contracts." Id. at 79-81.
228.
Ethereum's standardized set of smart-contract instructions allows various digital
tokens to retain a common, consistent format allowing these tokens to be traded on top of Ethereum's
blockchain even after the conclusion of an ICO. Id. at 102.
229.
Id. at 84, 99.
230.
Id.
231.
According to some estimates, the total amount raised in ICOs in 2017 exceeded
$5.6 billion. Oscar Williams-Grut, Only 48% of ICOs Were Successful Last Year But Startups Still
Managed to Raise $5.6 Billion, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 31, 2018), http://www.businessinsider.com/howmuch-raised-icos-2017-tokendata-2017-2018-1 [https://perma.cc/NP44-M6EU].
232.
Oscar Williams-Grut, The 11 Biggest ICO Fundraisesof201 7, BUS. INSIDER (Jan.
1,
2018),
https://www.businessinsider.com/the-10-biggest-ico-fundraises-of-2017-2017-12
[https://perma.cc/8DU6-UE6P]. The biggest ICO of 2017 was Filecoin, which raised about $257 million
from sales of a token entitling its holders to blockchain-based data storage space. Id. Perhaps the most
interesting case from the perspective of this Article was the SALT Lending Platform ICO, with the tokens
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To fintech enthusiasts, ICOs signal a profoundly democratic shift in market
power from traditional venture capital firms to users of the relevant digital
product or service. 3 3 Yet, it is undeniable that ICOs are often seen as purely
speculative financial plays.2 34 Throughout 2017, investors were ready to snap up
ICO "assets," often in a matter of minutes, without much due diligence
conducted in traditional securities offerings.2 35 They didn't appear to worry
about whether or not the tokens they were buying were related to an
economically viable enterprise, or to any economic activity outside the cryptoasset space.236 Undiscriminating investor demand for tradable tokens drove
237
inflated ICO valuations, a familiar sign of a speculative asset boom.

Predictably, surging ICOs raised alarm among financial regulators
concerned with investor fraud and criminally connected fundraising. 238 From a
systemic perspective, however, ICOs implicate a far more structurally significant
shift. Complete virtualization of tradable assets enables-at least in principle,
but very likely in practice as well-a virtually complete separation of the
financial system from the real economy. Free of any "natural" productivityrelated constraints, financial markets will easily morph into sites of pure cryptospeculation. Left unconstrained, this continuous generation of tradable bits of
encrypted data will easily transcend the limits of traditional systemic stability
regulation, leaving both the financial system and the real economy vulnerable to
shocks originating in an increasingly self-referential crypto-space. It will also
render regulators' task of protecting investors and capital markets from abuse
and misconduct inherently impossible to perform via traditional means.

designed to allow holders of cryptocurrencies to use them as collateral for borrowing in fiat currencies.
Id.
233.
See Richard Waters, To Coin a Craze: Silicon Valley's CryptocurrencyBoom, FIN.
TIMES (Sept.
13, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/2b0d8926-96d9-11e7-b83c-9588e51488a0
[https://perma.cc/P2U8-XHUC].
234.
Id.
235.
See CASEY & VIGNA, supranote 204, at 103-04 (citing to an ICO by Gnosis, whose
platform allows users to create prediction markets for betting on anything, in which the company raised
$12.5 million in twelve minutes).
236.
See Waters, supranote 233.
237.
Id. Even high post-ICO failure rates did not dampen this speculative demand. See
Aaron Hankin, Nearly Half of All 2017 ICOs Failed, MARKETWATCH (Feb. 26, 2018),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/nearly-half-of-all-2017-icos-have-failed-2018-02-26
[https://perma.cc/88PG-9C4J].
238.
For example, China and South Korea banned ICOs in 2017. See Darryn Pollock,
From Gibraltar to Australia: How Countries Approach ICOs, COINTELEGRAPH (Feb.

16, 2018),

https:/cointelegraph.com/news/from-gibraltar-to-australia-how-countries-approach-icos
[https://perma.cc/6H5L-8GXE]. In the United States, the SEC announced that certain ICOs may constitute
securities issuances subject to federal securities laws. See Spotlight on Initial Coin Offerings, SEC,
https://www.sec.gov/ICO [https://perma.cc/6VPL-CTVT]. In 2018, the SEC brought several enforcement
actions against crypto-token issuers. See Will Hernandez, Blockchain Startup Inches Closer to Legally
Tradable Tokens, AM. BANKER (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/blockchainstartup-inches-closer-to-legally-tradable-tokens [https://perma.cc/KR8R-ANAK].
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2. Robo-Advising: Scaling Up Trading
Robo-advisors are "automated interfaces that offer investment advice and
discretionary investment management services without an intervention of a
human advisor, using algorithms and asset allocation models that are advertised
as being tailored to each individual's investment needs." 239 Robo-advising is
quickly becoming a mainstream financial service. Charles Schwab, Vanguard,
and Fidelity offer robo-advising services. 240 Even Morgan Stanley, one of Wall
Street's most venerable investment banks, launched a robo-advising unit in
December 2017.241
Because robo-advisors eliminate expensive human labor and use
algorithmic trading to maintain or adjust clients' portfolio allocations, their
services are significantly cheaper than those of traditional wealth managers.242
Robo-advisors are potentially able to offer relatively simple and cost-effective
investment options mainly, index mutual funds and passive exchange-traded
funds-to a wider array of clients.243 The absence of human intervention is also
touted as an attractive feature of robo-advising because it promises to eliminate
potential conflicts of interest plaguing the fund management industry.244 For
these reasons, proponents of robo-advising routinely portray it as a valuable tool
of financial inclusion and "democratizing" wealth management by broadening
its availability beyond the exclusive world of wealthy people.245 Critics, on the
other hand, contest these claims as significantly overstating the cost-efficiency
and integrity of robo-advice and warn against channeling retirement and retail
investors' money into these automated accounts. 246
It is hardly surprising that the continuing growth of robo-advising invites
debate. Replacing humans with algorithms in an area traditionally based on

239.
Chin, supra note 5, at 88. Robo-advisors rely on online questionnaires, filled out
by prospective clients, to devise asset allocation and trading strategies that most closely track each client's
expressed investment goals, preferences, and general risk parameters.
240.
See Matthew Frankel, Robo-Advisers: What They Cost and What You Get,
MOTLEY FOOL (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.fool.com/retirement/2017/11/13/robo-advisors-what-theycost-and-what-you-get.aspx [https://perma.cc/NSA3-Z72K]. Charles Schwab and Vanguard are, of
course, already well known as pioneers in democratizing access to wealth management.
241.
Maria Terekhova, Morgan Stanley Launches a Robo-Adviser After 6 Month Pilot,
BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 5, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/morgan-stanley-launches-a-robo-advisorafter-i 6-month-pilot-2017-12 [https://perma.cc/B5TK-AL22].
242.
Chiu, supranote 5, at 89.
243.
Id.
244.
Baker & Dellaert, supranote 6, at 726. For an easily accessible and comprehensive
account of pervasive agency problems in the mutual fund industry, see WILLIAM A. BIRDTHISTLE, EMPIRE
OF THE FUND: THE WAY WE SAVE NOw (2016).
245.

See Robo-Advisors: Capitalizing on a Growing Opportunity, DELOITTE (2015),

https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/strategy/us-cons-robo-advisors.pdf
[https://perma.cc/72R8-A8C8].
246.
See, e.g., Melanie Fein, Robo-Advisers: A Closer Look (Working Paper, 2015),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2658701 [https://perma.cc/Y44X-PVZW].
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relationships and exercise of professional judgment by trusted fiduciaries is not
simply a matter of lowering fees.247 It raises a host of important legal and
regulatory issues, especially with respect to advisors' fiduciary duties and
investor protection under securities laws.24 8 These issues, however, are beyond
the scope of this Article. For present purposes, it is critical to focus on the broader
potential systemic significance of robo-advising.
One important factor in this respect is that the lower cost and thus broader
accessibility of robo-advising is not simply a result of eliminating the expense
of hiring a human expert. This cost efficiency is also a product of passive indextracking strategies typically pursued by robo-advisers. Robo-advice tends to
channel clients' money into ETFs and other passive investments, often also
determined by algorithms, which are inherently cheaper than actively managed
fund products.24 9
In this sense, robo-advising appears to amplify both fundamental patterns
of secondary market growth, discussed above: it enables synthesizing of new
tradable assets, and it serves to scale up the aggregate trading activity in financial
markets.250 Reaching significant segments of the population previously unable
to participate in capital markets potentially improves ordinary people's access to
investment opportunities. At least as importantly, however, it also improves the
market's "access" to their savings.25' Through robo-advising, new market
entrants' money is used to create new financial products that can then be pooled
and layered, potentially many times over. This constant influx of new "base"
products is critical for sustaining the financial market's built-in tendency to keep
scaling up.
Furthermore, as discussed above, the central role of algorithmic trading in
the robo-advising business model has a direct and potentially massive
acceleration effect on financial asset trading.252 The fact that, in generating all of
this additional trading activity, robo-advisers tend to use similar algorithms

247.

For an insightful and integrated analysis of robo-advice, see Baker & Dellaert,

supranote 6.
248.
See id.; Chin, supra note 5; Melanie Fein, Are Robo-Advisors Fiduciaries?
(Working
Paper,
2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3028268
[https://perma.cc/2NHF-CZX9].
249.
FIN. STABILITY BD., FINANCIAL STABILITY IMPLICATIONS FROM FIN TECH:
SUPERVISORY AND REGULATORY ISSUES THAT MERIT AUTHORITIES' ATTENTION 43-45 (June 27, 2017),

http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/R270617.pdf [https://perma.cc/4F82-YZBS].
250.
See supra Section II.B. This is, of course, not the first time the sheer "scale risk"
is identified as a potentially significant concern in the robo-advising context. For a detailed discussion of
specific scale-related risks associated with the growth of robo-advice, particularly in the context of
investment advisor regulation, see Baker & Dellaert, supranote 6, at 742-46. See also Antje Berndt et al.,
Competition in the Financial Advisory Markets: Robo Versus Traditional Advisors (June 15, 2017),
https:/custom.cvent.com/CE4DO900F85346CA814BF33A31F03D88/files/9190645f386d4d9fa70809cf
51438257.pdf [https://perma.cc/9TKZ-79T8] (discussing the impact of the growing scale of robo-advice
on the levels of concentration in the financial advisory market).
251.
See Baker & Dellaert, supra note 6, at 742.
252.
See supra Section II.B.2.c.
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raises serious stability-related concerns about potential herding behavior and the
possibility of rapid unidirectional portfolio shifts. 53 Not only are there many
more super-fast trades being executed via robo-advisors' algorithms, these trades
are likely to form potentially highly correlated tidal waves of money moving in
and out of the same asset classes.254
In fact, there are serious reasons to believe that the real driver behind the
rapidly rising popularity of robo-advising is not the commonly touted
"democratizing" impulse but the growing appeal of algorithmic trading as a
portfolio-enhancing strategy for wealthy investors. Thus, it appears that roboadvisors are increasingly targeting wealthy (or relatively wealthy) investors who
are already in the market, rather than the truly "under-served" low-income
people.255 Many large robo-advisors are introducing minimum account balance
requirements for access to digital investment services, ranging from $25,000 to
$50,000 and possibly higher.2 56 For this contingent of wealthy investors, roboservices are a source of new, cost-efficient portfolio diversification
opportunities. In line with the same logic, Morgan Stanley's robo-advising unit
is said to target primarily the millennial children of the bank's existing clients.257
Tellingly, there are stark parallels between these developments and the
dynamics in marketplace lending, discussed above. There, what started as a
promise of a peer-to-peer credit system quickly evolved into another rendition
of the institution-dominated market for high-yield consumer debt.2 58 Here, what
started as a promise of opening the world of investment to the poor is quickly
evolving into the reality of opening the world of (yet more) speculative trading
to the wealthy.
As these examples demonstrate, technology alone cannot make the
financial system more "democratic" or "just." Democratizing finance cannot be
reduced to a purely technical exercise in decentralizing financial services or
making them cheaper through the use of algorithms. It is an inherently political
exercise, and only a democratic polity can achieve that goal through a coherent

253.
FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 249, at 45-46.
254.
Id.
255.
See Bryan Yurcan & Suleman Din, Will Cheap Advice Turn Off Wealthy Clients?,
AM. BANKER (June 5, 2018), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/fifth-third-securities-and-fidelitypartner-on-automated-advice-for-small-investors [https://perma.cc/A89M-EC3N] (discussing how large
financial institutions' robo-advising services target the "mass affluent audience").
256.
Id. ("Wells Fargo and U.S. Bank have digital advice account minimums double
that of Fifth Third's. And by blending human service with digital platforms, other firms have sought
wealthier clients. Schwab's Intelligent Advisory service has a $25,000 account minimum, while
Vanguard's Personal Advisor Services (the largest digital advice platform, with over $100 billion in assets
under management) has a $50,000 account minimum.").
257.
See Terekhova, supranote 241.
258.
See supra Section III.B.1.
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The real question is

whether the exciting new technology will be used to aid or to impede this
process.
C. Fintech as a Systemic Phenomenon: Unsettling the Public-PrivateBalance
This brief overview of certain key developments in the rapidly evolving
fintech sector is not meant to be an exhaustive catalogue of everything that this
sector has to offer. Nor does it claim to present a full analysis of specific legal,
technical, and policy issues these developments raise.260 Instead, the purpose of
the present discussion is to trace the fundamental continuity behind the fintech
"disruption," in search of a new conceptual and normative perspective for
understanding fintech as a systemic phenomenon.
Standard accounts of the systemic implications of fintech activities tend to
present lengthy sets of fintech-related factors that are likely either to reduce
various systemic risks or to amplify them. Some of the commonly listed financial
stability enhancers include, for example, systemic risk-reducing effects of
making transacting faster and easier (i.e., eliminating market "frictions") and
greater competition in the financial services industry.26' Potential systemic risk
amplifiers, on the other hand, include the heightened tendency toward herding
behavior and procyclicality, greater vulnerability to technical glitches and
operational failures, and the rise of the systemic importance of non-financial
firms.262

Although these are valid and serious arguments worthy of attention and
study, the focus of this Article is on the deeper and broader-dynamics within
the financial system. As argued above, the New Deal political settlement
established the fundamental balance of public and private roles, competencies,
and responsibilities in the financial sphere.263 Under its terms, private market
participants are primarily in control of allocating financial capital, while the

259.
For a comprehensive theoretical and practical analysis and justification of, and
specific proposals for implementing, such institutional reform, see, for example, Hockett & Omarova,
PublicActors, supra note 45; and Hockett & Omarova, supra note 44.
260.
For recent analyses of these issues, see sources cited supranotes 4-5.
261.
See FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 249, at 16-17.
262.
Id. at 20-21. Overall, however, the currently prevailing attitude among regulators
appears to be that, due to their relatively small scale, the emerging markets for crypto-assets pose no
appreciable threat to systemic financial stability. For recent official statements to that effect, see, for
example, EUR. SECS. & MKTS. AUTH., ADVICE: INITIAL COIN OFFERINGS AND CRYPTO-ASSETS 17 (Jan.

9, 2019), https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/esma50-157-139lcryptoadvice.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7BPB-7RV9]; EUR. BANKING AUTH., REPORT WITH ADVICE FOR THE EUROPEAN
COMMISSION
ON
CRYPTO-ASSETS
4
(Jan.
9,
2019),
https:/eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/2545547/EBA+Report+on+crypto+assets.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z4T9-STLQ]. See also U.K CRYPTOASSETS TASKFORCE, supra note 4, at 38-39. As the
preceding discussion shows, this reasoning reflects a fundamentally incomplete understanding of the true
systemic "scale effects" of fintech.
263.
See supra Section I.B.
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sovereign public is primarily responsible for maintaining macro-financial
stability.264 From this perspective, the emerging fintech technologies and
activities are not merely recreating some of the familiar sources of systemic risk
or rearranging the familiar institutional landscape of financial services. At the
higher level of magnitude, fintech's systemic impact has to be assessed in terms
of its potential to cause a decisive shift in the currently existing public-private
balance in finance.
While it is difficult to generalize across the evolving and varied fintech
space, the new technologies' self-proclaimed unifying raisond'tre is qualitative
transformation and optimization of transactional capacity in financial markets.
Importantly, that refers primarily, if not exclusively, to private transacting
capacity.26 5 In some instances, this goal of directly empowering the private, as
opposed to the public, side of the financial market is quite explicit. Bitcoin
enthusiasts, for example, openly tout that cryptocurrency's ambition and ability
to do away with sovereign governments' control over money.266 In most
instances, however, the rhetoric of fintech consciously emphasizes its potential
to yield significant public benefits: financial inclusion, greater financial
autonomy, and greater convenience, among other things.267
Yet, even a brief examination of these new technologies reveals the sense
in which they systematically tip the scale in favor of the private, as opposed to
the public, side of the New Deal settlement. By making transacting in financial
markets infinitely faster, cheaper, and easier to accomplish, fintech critically
augments the ability of private actors to synthesize tradable financial claims-or
private liabilities-and thus generate new financial risks on an unprecedented
scale. Moreover, as the discussion of Bitcoin and ICOs shows, new cryptotechnology enables private firms to synthesize tradable financial assets
effectively out of thin air.268 This may be thought of as the crucial last step in the
decades-long process of virtualization of financial claims-e.g., through creation
of derivatives and other highly structured financial products which will finally
render financial markets entirely self-referential.269
It is difficult to overestimate the significance of this leap for the financial
and economic systems. Making financial trading explicitly divorced from the

264.
Id.
265.
This is, of course, natural, given that most fintech applications are being developed
by profit-seeking private market participants. Governments may and do participate in fintech projects,
especially as they explore the potential for issuing sovereign cryptocurrencies, but they have not yet
commandeered any particular technology for principally public use.
266.
See Lastra & Allen, supra note 162, at 18-20.
267.
Id.; see also TREASURY REPORT, supranote 4, at 17.
268.
See supra Section III.A. 1.
269.
It is also worth noting that, on a deeper normative level, the increasing emphasis
on the speed of transacting may further undermine the value of patience-and thus patient capital--in
finance, which is bound to have significant macro-economic implications. For a discussion of "patient
capital" as a form of publicly salient good and as a necessary condition for stable and sustainable longterm macroeconomic development, see Hockett & Omarova, supra note 44, at 450-51.
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production of any actual goods or services in the real, or non-financial, economy
will have enormous consequences both for financing and organizing the entire
economic system and for managing the financial sector.
Among other things, it will make it increasingly difficult, if not impossible,
for the sovereign public to continue safeguarding and guaranteeing macrofinancial stability. The sheer scale and complexity of the financial market
effectively "liberated" from exogenously imposed constraints on its growth will
make it inherently more volatile and unstable-and, consequently, both far more
dependent on public support and requiring far greater quantities of such support.
The same factors, however, will also make it increasingly difficult, if not
impossible, for the public to control, or even track, new technology-driven
proliferation of risk in the financial system. Moreover, the underlying policy
rationale for the public accommodation of privately created financial
liabilities-namely, the publicly salient role of financial markets in channeling
investments in the real economy will effectively disappear. In short, in this new
environment, the public will be forced to bear a vastly greater (and difficult to
quantify in advance) burden of stabilizing an increasingly unstable and
uncontrollable financial system that keeps growing for the sake of its own
growth.
The key point here is not to assert the inevitability of this, or any other,
specific scenario. My purpose is to show why fintech as a systemic phenomenon
cannot be reduced to a mere collection of specific transactional friction-solving
tools. Fintech has to be appreciated for its potentially game-changing effect on
the existing balance of public and private power to define the fundamental
purpose and direction of the financial system. Even at this early stage, it is
increasingly apparent that various forms of "disruptive" fintech technologies, in
fact, operate in tandem with and amplify the same long-standing financial market
dynamics pooling and layering of financial assets and acceleration and
compression of financial transactions-that have been gradually eroding the
New Deal settlement. If (or when?) fintech delivers on its promise to make these
mechanisms virtually frictionless, thus taking their operation to a qualitatively
different level, the financial market will completely forsake the frail confines of
the New Deal settlement. We need to start thinking seriously about what should
replace it. In this sense, fintech is ultimately a matter of public policy of the
highest order.
Conclusion
Fintech is visibly "disrupting" traditional methods of delivering financial
services and conducting financial transactions. Less visibly, it is also changing
the way we think about finance and envision its future trajectory. The rise of
fintech is gradually recasting our collective understanding of the financial system
in seemingly objective (science-driven and normatively neutral) terms, as simply
another sphere of applying advanced information technologies and computing
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power to eliminate specific transactional "frictions" in financial markets. By
making transacting faster, easier, cheaper, and instantly adjustable to individual
parties' needs and preferences, new technology seems to promise a "win-win"
solution to the financial system's many ills.
This Article has presented an alternative account of fintech as a systemic,
as opposed to merely transactional, phenomenon. Grounding the evolving
fintech trends in the broader institutional context of the financial markets'
operation, the Article exposed the normative and political significance of the
current fintech moment. The arrival of these new-generation technologies
enables a potentially decisive shift in the underlying balance of the sovereign
public's and private actors' relative powers, competencies, and roles in the
financial system. By making transacting faster, easier, cheaper, and instantly
adjustable to individual parties' needs and preferences, new technology is
empowering private actors to engage in virtually unconstrained financial
speculation. Unless the public side proactively counters new technologies'
potentially destabilizing systemic effects, it may soon find itself in an impossible
position of having to back up an uncontrollable and unsustainably self-referential
financial system.270
To be clear, the purpose of this Article is not to over-dramatize potential
dangers, or to deny potential benefits, of fintech. Far from it. New technology
opens a wide range of previously inconceivable possibilities for improving our
shared financial lives and for creating fuller, more capacious forms of financial
citizenship. 27 ' At this relatively early stage, it would be premature to issue any
definitive conclusions as to what fintech's ultimate impact on society is going to
be, or what specific risks individual technologies are going to pose to financial
stability. It is vitally important, however, to take an informed systemic view of
the unfolding fintech "revolution" well before these risks materialize. Only by
doing so can we begin harnessing the transformative power of fintech for our
collective long-term benefit. This Article takes a critical first step toward that
goal.

270.
Such proactive public counter-action would have to be an exercise in applied
institutional imagination on a deeper level, and in a far more encompassing manner, than what is typically
involved in devising specific regulatory fixes to specific fintech-related problems. In practice, the latter
often precedes the former, as regulatory agencies on the ground are usually the first to feel the immediate
pressure to respond to specific market changes. Yet, to avoid the obvious pitfalls of a perennially
fragmented piece-meal approach to fintech, it is critical to develop a normatively coherent and
programmatic system-wide strategy of redefining the public-private balance of power in today's techdriven finance. What that strategy might look like, however, is the subject of a separate research project.
271.
For a fascinating, and fascinatingly optimistic, account of these possibilities, see
CASEY & VIGNA, supranote 204.
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